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IMPLICIT LIMITS ON AMENDING THE JAPANESE 
CONSTITUTION 
Adam N. Sterling  
Abstract: 
constitutional revision, and after attaining a two-thirds majority in both Houses of the 
only hurdles to amending the Constitution of Japan are the amendment procedures 
stipulated in Article 96. The plain text of Article 96 requires a two-thirds vote in both 
Houses followed by popular referendum, but it poses no explicit limitations on the scope 
of any amendment even the amendment process itself is fair game at first glance. 
Nevertheless, Japanese scholars have claimed that limits must exist to Article 96, lest an 
amendment destroy the Constitution itself. This Comment seeks to discover whether any 
such implicit limits exist based on a comprehensive analysis of the text and structure of 
the current Constitution as well as the Meiji Constitution. In so doing, this Comment 
attempts to provide a roadmap for Japanese courts to assert the power of judicial review 
over amendments that would do harm to the core values enshrined in the Constitution. 
Cite as: Adam N. Sterling, Implicit Limits on Amending the Japanese Constitution, 28 
WASH. INT L L.J. 243 (2019). 
I. INTRODUCTION 
1 has generated no small volume of international scholarship. 
Much of that scholarly contribution has focused on critiquing the many 
substantive reforms sought by the majority Liberal Democratic Party 
, 2  including revision of the Pacifism Clause in Article 9. 3  This 
                                                 
 J.D., University of Washington School of Law, class of 2018. M.A. in Public Policy, D shisha 
University, class of 2013. The author would like to thank Professors Larry Repeta, Dongsheng Zang, for 
their support and advice, as well as the editorial staff of the Washington International Law Journal. 
1 Drafting of the postwar Japanese Constitution began in late 1945, it was officially promulgated on 
November 3, 1946, and it went into effect on May 3, 1947. See generally Birth of the Constitution of 
Japan: Chronological Table, NAT L DIET LIBR., http://www.ndl.go.jp/constitution/e/etc/history.html (last 
visited Sept. 4, 2018) (detailing major events throughout the process of creating the current constitution). 
See Carl F. Goodman, Contemplated 
, 26 WASH. INT L 
L.J. 17, 18 (2017). 
2 See Richard Albert, Amending Constitutional Amendment Rules, 13 INT L J. CONST. L. 655, 657 
(2015); Goodman, supra note 1, at 19; Craig Martin, The Legitimacy of Informal Constitutional 
 , 40 FORDHAM INT L L.J. 427, 428 (2017). 
3 See NIHONKOKU K [K ] [CONSTITUTION], art. 9, para. 1 (Japan), http://www.ndl.go.jp/ 
[T]he Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the 
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Constitution the nickname eace 4 spurring international 
support for the renunciation of war as a goal for all humankind.5 Despite 
such widespread support both within Japan and abroad,6 Article 9 has faced 
repeated calls for amendment from conservative Japanese politicians.7 This 
dynamic is compounded by the fact that, ever since 1955, -party 
position 
parties unable to contend with the conservative LDP
-war history.8 As such
thus far has been less the result of opposition parties  than 
economic priorities and bickering among factions within the LDP, all of 
which have combined to effectively block any reform efforts.9 This debate 
has once again been thrust into the international spotlight with Prime 
to amend Article 9, along with the 
entirety of the 1946 Constitution.10 The only constitutional barrier to these 
proposed revisions is the amendment process in Article 96. 
                                                 
4 See, e.g., C. Douglas Lummis, We, the Japanese People: Rethinking the Meaning of the Peace 
Constitution, ASIA-PAC. J. (2018), https://apjjf.org/-C--Douglas-Lummis/5118/article.pdf. 
5 itution to be awarded the Nobel 
Peace Prize. See D. McN., , ECONOMIST (May 14, 2014), 
https://www.economist.com/blogs/banyan/2014/05/keeping-the-peace.  
6 See, e.g., Albert, supra note 2, at 675. 
7 Id.; see also Michael A. Panton, Politics, Practice and Pacifism: Revising Article 9 of the 
Japanese Constitution, 11 ASIAN-PAC. L & POL Y J. 163, 183 (2009). 
8 See Samee Siddiqui, The Rise and Fall of the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ): Prospects of a 
Two-Party System in Japan, ALJAZEERA CTR. FOR STUD. 2 (Feb. 26, 2013), 
http://studies.aljazeera.net/mritems/Documents/2013/2/25/2013225115850517734The%20Rise%20and%2
0Fall%20of%20the%20Democratic%20Party%20of%20Japan.pdf; Yuichiro Tsuji, Reflection of Public 
Interest in the Japanese Constitution: Constitutional Amendment, 46 ENV. J. INT L L. & POL Y 159, 160 61 
(2018)
parliament, known as the Diet, was from 2009 to 2011. See Siddiqui, supra, at 3. LDP dominance in 
Japanese politics grew from the merger of two major conservative parties in 1955, which is why this 
See Modern Japan in Archives: Establishment of 1955 
System, NAT L DIET LIBR., http://www.ndl.go.jp/modern/e/cha6/index.html (last visited Sept. 4, 2018); 
Jayshree Bajoria, The Rise of Political Opposition in Japan, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL., 
https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/rise-political-opposition-japan (last updated Aug. 31, 2009). 
9 See FRANK O. MILLER, MINOBE TATSUKICHI: INTERPRETER OF CONSTITUTIONALISM IN JAPAN 288 
(1965); cf. Craig Martin, Binding the Dogs of War: Japan and the Constitutionalizing of Jus ad Bellum, 30 
U. PA. J. INT L L. 267, 328
shield against pressure from the United States to remilitarize allowed the LDP to focus on economic growth 
during the Cold War). 
10 See Albert, supra note 2, at 660; Motoko Rich, 
Pacifist Constitution, N.Y. TIMES (May 3, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/03/world/asia/japan-
constitution-shinzo-abe-military.html. See generally Kenp  kaisei s an  o happy  [Announcing the 
Draft for the Amendment of the Constitution ], JIMIN NEWS (Liberal Democratic Party [LDP], 
Japan), Apr. 27, 2012, https://www.jimin.jp/policy/policy_topics/recapture/pdf/063.pdf (providing a brief 
outline of past reform efforts and describing how the proposed amendments would change the current 
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Despite these persistent efforts to invoke the amendment process, the 
Constitution has never actually been amended. 11  Article 96 of the 
Constitution of Japan contains the following process for proposing and 
adopting constitutional amendments: 
Amendments to this Constitution shall be initiated by the Diet, 
through a concurring vote of two-thirds or more of all the 
members of each House and shall thereupon be submitted to the 
people for ratification, which shall require the affirmative vote 
of a majority of all votes cast thereon, at a special referendum 
or at such election as the Diet shall specify. 
Amendments when so ratified shall immediately be 
promulgated by the Emperor in the name of the people, as an 
integral part of this Constitution.12 
Faced with the daunting task of overcoming these constitutional barriers to 
amendments, in early 2013, Prime Minister Abe responded by changing 
tactics to focus on first amending the amendment process itself.13 The LDP 
published its proposed revisions to the entirety of the 1946 Constitution in 
                                                                                                                                                 
Constitution); LDP Announces a New Draft Constitution for Japan, J  (May 7, 2012), 
https://www.jimin.jp/english/news/117099.html. For an example of efforts to persuade younger 
Japanese of the need for constitutional revision, see Manga Pamphlet, 
Honbu [LDP Headquarters for the Promotion of Revision of the Constitution], Honobono ikka no kenp  
kaisei tte n ni? [The Honobono Family in What is a Constitutional Amendment?] (Apr. 2015), 
http://jimin.ncss.nifty.com/pdf/pamphlet/kenoukaisei_manga_pamphlet.pdf. 
11 See Albert, supra note 2, at 659. Popular support of Article 9 and opposition to constitutional 
revision has resulted in the failure of any amendment proposals to ever actually materialize. See Lawrence 
Repeta & Colin P.A. Jones, 
and Possible Futures, in JAPAN: THE PRECARIOUS FUTURE 304, 307 (Frank Baldwin & Anne Allison eds., 
2015) (finding no record of the LDP ever submitting any amendment proposal to the Diet). 
12 K  art. 96. 
13 Prime Minister Abe did briefly retreat when faced with strong opposition from constitutional 
scholars and others. See Editorial, LDP Out to Undermine Constitution, JAPAN TIMES (Apr. 18, 2013), 
https://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2013/04/18/editorials/ldp-out-to-undermine-constitution/. Scholars 
organize symposia and protests across Japan. See Ishibashi Hideaki, Ga -
 [ A Call to Oppose 
Revision for the House of Councillors Election], ASAHI SHINBUN (May 23, 2013, 8:21 PM), 
http://digital.asahi.com/articles/TKY201305230274.htm [http://blog.livedoor.jp/gataroclone/archives/ 
27376713.html]; Mizushima Asaho, 96-j  no Kai  hassoku Rikken shugi no teichaku ni mukete (1) 
[Inauguration of the Toward the Establishment of Constitutionalism (1)], 
ASAHO.COM (May 27, 2013), http://www.asaho.com/jpn/bkno/2013/0527.html. For an overview of the 
response from the academic community, see Okano Yayo, 
and the Assault on Individual Rights, ASIA-PAC. J. 2 4 (Mar. 1, 2018), https://apjjf.org/-Okano-
Yayo/5519/article.pdf. 
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2012.14 The LDP Draft for the Amendment of the Constitution of Japan 
 
Amendments to this Constitution shall be initiated by members 
of the House of Representatives or the House of Councillors, 
through a concurring vote of a majority of all the members of 
each House, and shall thereupon be submitted to the people for 
ratification, which shall require the affirmative vote of a 
majority of all valid votes cast thereon, at a referendum as 
specified by law. 
Amendments when so ratified shall immediately be 
promulgated by the Emperor.15 
Immediately, there is one substantive change that the proposed amendment 
would effectuate lowering the initial barrier to constitutional amendment 
from a supermajority to a simple majority vote in the Diet.16 
Even though support for the initial LDP Draft has waned,17 the LDP 
coalition recently surpassed  supermajority barrier in the 2016 
and 2017 elections,18 prompting Prime Minister Abe to reignite discussions 
                                                 
14 For an overview of the problematic nature of the LDP Draft, Lawrence Repeta, 
Democracy at Risk , ASIA-PAC. J. 
(July 14, 2013), https://apjjf.org/Lawrence-Repeta/3969/article.pdf; Repeta & Jones, supra note 11 
(categorizing and critiquing the types of reforms contained in the LDP Draft). 
15 
Amendment of the Constitution of Japan] art. 100 (Apr. 27, 2012) (emphasis added), 
https://jimin.ncss.nifty.com/pdf/news/policy/130250_1.pdf, as translated in Draft for the Amendment of the 
Constitution of Japan, VOYCE, https://www.voyce-jpn.com/ldp-draft-constitution (last updated Apr. 18, 
2016) [hereinafter LDP Draft]; see also Tomohiro Osaki, LDP Sets Aside 2012 Draft Constitution Ahead of 
Diet Debate on Revision, JAPAN TIMES (Oct. 18, 2016), http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/ 
2016/10/18/national/politics-diplomacy/ldp-sets-aside-2012-draft-constitution-ahead-diet-debate-revision/ 
(describing how the LDP coalition achieved two-thirds of both houses in the 2016 election, but had 
publicly stated that it will postpone any action on the 2012 draft). 
16 Some of the other changes to Article 96 include simple clarifications of the proposal and voting 
procedures, as well as a requirement that the votes be valid.  Conspicuously omitted, however, is the final 
portion stating that amendments are promulgated in the name of the people, as an integral part of this 
Constitution.  This omission is important to the extent that it would bring the new amendment process in 
line with the overall objective of the LDP draft, which is to eliminate the people  and return the Emperor 
to semi-sovereign status. See Goodman, supra note 2, at 37 45; Yuichiro Tsuji, supra note 8, at 162. 
17 See LDP Shelves Controversial Constitutional Draft, MAINICHI (Oct. 18, 2016), 
https://mainichi.jp/english/articles/20161018/p2a/00m/0na/021000c. 
18 See Leika Kihara & Linda Sieg, 
Election Win, REUTERS (Oct. 21, 2017, 4:35 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-japan-election/abe-to-
push-reform-of-japans-pacifist-constitution-after-election-win-idUSKBN1CQ0UW. The first electoral 
For an explanation of 
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on amending the Constitution. 19  Nevertheless, even with supermajority 
control over both Houses, neither the public nor the House of Councillors is 
solidly in support of amending the Constitution.20 So long as Article 96 
remains intact, -time goal 
remains . Starting with small amendments, the Diet 
can codify new constitutional rights that are more likely to garner public 
support. 21  Accordingly, LDP can build toward lowering the amendment 
threshold in Article 96 to finally push through the more controversial 
changes. Although such a strategy appears more politically viable, it 
inevitably raises more troubling questions. For example, if the Diet could 
pass regular legislation under the same vote threshold as amendments, is the 
Constitution still the supreme law of the land? What would happen to other 
provisions in the Constitution that still require a two-thirds majority? And 
can a constitutional amendment legitimately repeal fundamental components 
of the Constitution of Japan? 
This Comment aims to provide answers to these questions by 
attempting to identify implicit limits to the amendment process under Article 
96. Rather than applying a purely theoretical approach based on constituent 
                                                                                                                                                 
Abenomics,  see Abenomics, JAPANGOV, https://www.japan.go.jp/abenomics/index.html. The second 
electoral victory was more in response to the looming threat of North Korea. See Masazumi Wakatabe, A 
Snap Election in Japan May Endanger Abenomics, FORBES (Sept. 21, 2017, 10:20 PM), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/mwakatabe/2017/09/21/snap-election-japan-endanger-abenomics-shinzo-
abe/; Anthony Fensom, Japan Election Victory Gives Abe Mandate for Reform, DIPLOMAT (Oct. 23, 2017), 
https://thediplomat.com/2017/10/japan-election-victory-gives-abe-mandate-for-reform/. 
19 See New Draft Constitution to Be Submitted to Parliament PM Abe, JAPAN FORWARD (June 26, 
2017, 5:06 PM), https://japan-forward.com/under-the-flag-of-constitution-revision-prime-minister-abe-
resolves-to-go-on-the-offensive/. Prime Minister Abe has stated that he expects to have a new draft 
constitution ready in time for the 2020 Tokyo Olympics. See Leo Lewis, Abe Sets 2020 Target to Revise 
, FIN. TIMES (May 3, 2017), https://www.ft.com/content/a4d2aaa0-2fd9-11e7-
9555-23ef563ecf9a. In the newest round of talks, the primary focus was reconciling the goal of legitimizing 
-Defense Force with efforts to maintain certain popular aspects of Article 9. See Memorandum, 
J DP Headquarters for the Promotion of Revision of the 
Constitution], Jimint  
Constitutional Amendments] (Dec. 20, 2017) https://jimin.ncss.nifty.com/pdf/news/policy/136448_1.pdf. 
The two possibilities identified in regard to Article 9 are to eliminate entirely the second clause which 
forbids Japan from maintaining any war potential consistent with the 2012 LDP Draft, or to retain both 
clauses while explicitly recognizing the Self-Defense Force as an exception. Id. 
20 See , MAINICHI (June 25, 
2016), https://mainichi.jp/english/articles/20160625/p2a/00m/0na/013000c (finding on 55% of all 
candidates for the 2016 House of Councillors election in favor of constitutional revision); Nearly 70% 
Oppose Diet Actions Directed at Constitutional Revision in 2018: Survey, JAPAN TIMES (Dec. 16, 2017), 
https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2017/12/16/national/nearly-70-oppose-plans-propose-constitutional-
amendment-diet-2018-poll/. 
21 See, e.g., LDP Draft, supra note 15, art. 19-2 (protecting the privacy of personal information); id. 
art. 25-2 (protecting the environment). 
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power and other abstract concepts,22 this Comment will attempt to provide 
concrete arguments that Japanese courts could potentially rely on to assert 
the power of judicial review over an allegedly unconstitutional constitutional 
amendment. In reality, because Article 96 has never been successfully 
invoked, this area of the law is very much a blank slate. As such, this 
Comment will address the constitutional interpretation issue from first 
principles by employing a comprehensive approach. Arguments will focus 
particularly on the text and structure of the 1946 Constitution as well as its 
predecessor, the Meiji Constitution, while looking to some contemporaneous 
drafting history to provide context.23 Due to the influence of American legal 
concepts in the Japanese Constitution,24 the Supreme Court of Japan has 
relied on U.S. Supreme Court cases in many instances,25 and the author for 
practical reasons as well will do the same. 
                                                 
22 See, e.g., Yaniv Roznai, Amendment Power, Constituent Power, and Popular Sovereignty: Linking 
Unamendability and Amendment Procedures, in THE FOUNDATIONS AND TRADITIONS OF CONSTITUTIONAL 
AMENDMENT 23 (Richard Albert et al. eds., 2017). 
23  meaning 
the text can reasonably bear. Cf. Green v. Bock Laundry Machine Co., 490 U.S. 504, 529 (1989) (Scalia, J., 
see 
ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS 33 (2012) 
y competent in the 
school of thought necessarily exists in Japan. Instead, the author relies on textualist canons of construction 
as a means of persuasive authority more capable of translating between different legal cultures. 
24 See SHIGENORI MATSUI, THE CONSTITUTION OF JAPAN: A CONTEXTUAL ANALYSIS 35 (2011); cf. 
Hideo Tanaka, Impact of Foreign Law in Japan: American Law, 14 CONTEMP. L. 287 (1966), as translated 
in THE JAPANESE LEGAL SYSTEM 245, 251 (Hideo Tanaka ed., 1976) (noting the strong influence of 
American law generally in many Japanese laws). German legal concepts have also played a major role in 
See SHIGENORI MATSUI, supra, at 35 
influence also remained. The modern constitutional history of Japan can be said to be an implantation of 
A cf. id. at 154 
S
TATSUO, K [PRINCIPLES OF THE CONSTITUTION] 56680 (1982) (relying heavily on German 
constitutional theories, particularly those of Carl Schmitt, to describe implicit limits on Article 96). 
25 Because Japan is a civil law country and judicial precedent is technically not binding on other 
courts, scholarly opinions can be treated as equally if not more persuasive. See SHIGENORI MATSUI, supra 
note 24, at 23 24. Perhaps due to this lack of a legal tradition of citing precedent, judges frequently fail to 
provide citations in their decisions, even when quoting entire passages verbatim. See THE JAPANESE LEGAL 
SYSTEM, supra note 24, at 59 n.23. Nevertheless, there are several examples of cases in which Justices on 
the Supreme Court of Japan have directly referenced U.S. Supreme Court decisions. See, e.g.
Saibansh S SAIBANSHO MINJI HANRE [M ] 270, 
96, 247 S SAIBANSHO SAIBANSH [SAISH  MIJI] 39, (Chiba, J., concurring) (citing Ashwander v. Tenn. 
Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288 (1936)); cf. Sup. Ct. Sept. 10, 1975  48 (a) 910, 29 S SAIBANSHO KEIJI 
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One of the most recent and in-depth examinations of Article 96 and 
implicit limits on amending the Constitution of Japan is 
article, Amending Constitutional Amendment Rules. 26  While noting that 
Article 96 itself is not explicitly entrenched against amendment, Albert 
evaluates and rejects three potential arguments for implicit entrenchment, 
including judicial review.27  Nevertheless, t
primarily to provide an example of a present controversy. 28  In closing, 
Albert acknowledges the shortcomings in his analysis and notes that more 
history and failed subsequent amendment efforts.29 This Comment will build 
on  employing a comprehensive analysis to uncover 
whether implicit limits on Article 96 exist that a Japanese court could rely on 
to justify striking down an unconstitutional amendment.30 In particular, this 
comment will focus on textual bases within the Constitution albeit outside 
of Article 96 as well as historical context to delineate the metes and 
restrain governmental abuses of power, every constitution must be 
interpreted against its own unique history and legal culture.31 
                                                                                                                                                 
[K ] 489, (Kishi, J., concurring) 
 
26 Albert, supra note 2. Richard Albert is a Professor of Law at the University of Texas at Austin and 
writes about comparative constitutional law. See RICHARD ALBERT, http://richardalbert.com/ (last visited 
May 23, 2018).  
27 Albert, supra note 2, at 666
Id. at 658. This Comment is 
primarily  
28 Id. at 657 58.  
29 Id. at 685. 
30 This is all assuming, however, that the Supreme Court of Japan will in fact exercise its power of 
judicial review. The Court is notoriously conservative and generally has been willing to defer to the Diet in 
all but the most extreme cases almost sixty years after its inception, the Court has declared only a handful 
of parliamentary actions unconstitutional. See SHIGENORI MATSUI, supra note 24, at 145 47. In many 
standing or political question doctrines. See id. at 134 40; Shigenori Matsui, Why Is the Japanese Supreme 
Court So Conservative?, 88 WASH. U. L. REV. 1375, 1382 88 (2011). But cf. John O. Haley, Constitutional 
Adjudication in Japan: Context, Structures, and Values, 88 WASH. U. L. REV. 1467 (2011) (arguing that the 
tal factors). For an in-
& Jordan T. Wada, Comment, Can the Japanese Supreme Court Overcome the Political Question Hurdle?, 
26 WASH. INT L L.J. 349 (2017). 
31 Cf. KYOKO INOUE, MACARTHUR S JAPANESE CONSTITUTION 
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Part II of this Comment will pick up where Albert  left off. 
It will begin with a brief note on the drafting history of Article 96 and its 
relevance, followed by a reexamination of the only proposed constitutional 
amendment in Japanese history the 1946 Constitution itself. Scholarly 
views in Japan and other countries on the topic of implicit amendment limits 
are also briefly summarized as a potential source of persuasive authority. 
Part III will identify the structural and textual keys to understanding the 
implicit limits on what can and cannot be amended via Article 96. Finally, 
Part IV will synthesize the limitations identified in Part III to uncover how 
those provisions would constrain efforts to amend the amendment process 
itself. In doing so, this Comment attempts to transform the dialog 
surrounding the debate over Article 96 in Japan and provide concrete, text-
based arguments for recognizing implicit limits on the amendment process. 
II. ARTICLE 96 AND CURRENT ARGUMENTS IN THE DEBATE OVER IMPLICIT 
LIMITS ON THE AMENDMENT PROCESS 
A. Background on the Adoption of the 1946 Constitution and the 
Drafting History of Article 96 
Drafting history can be an invaluable tool in deciphering the intended 
meaning of complex and sometimes ambiguous constitutional provisions. 
This is particularly the case with the U.S. Constitution, as the Federalist 
Papers and the recorded debates in the Constitutional Convention provide a 
treasure trove of context. 32  However, 
situation counsel against placing much weight on the drafting history. First 
of all, legislative history is generally disfavored as a source of law in 
Japanese courts.33 Second, and more importantly, due to the complicated 
circumstances surrounding the 1946 Constituti
 
ion began with the end of World 
War II. After the unconditional surrender of Japan on August 15, 1945, 
General Douglas MacArthur was placed in charge of efforts to democratize 
                                                 
32 See generally AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA S CONSTITUTION 5 53 (2005) (describing the 
circumstances surrounding the adoption of the U.S. Constitution). 
33 See Tanaka, supra note 24, at 97 98. For the purposes of this Comment, this reality more than 
answers the question of whether drafting history should be given any credence.  
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Japanese society. 34  Under the direction of the Occupation
Headquarters 35 large-scale legal reforms commenced, and it soon 
became clear that revising the Meiji Constitution would be necessary to 
36 The Japanese government responded by 
establishing a committee to look into potential amendments to the Meiji 
Constitution.37 However, the initial draft crafted by the Diet, also known as 
the Matsumoto Draft, proposed only minor changes in wording to the Meiji 
Constitution and would have kept most of the Imperial structure intact.38 
When a newspaper leaked the conservative Matsumoto Draft to the public, it 
s both from Japanese citizens and 
the GHQ.39 Around that same time, various other scholarly associations and 
political parties also prepared drafts to replace the Meiji Constitution.40 
Fearing that the consisting of eleven of 
the Allied Powers and not just the United States41 would dilute 
influence and  the Japanese 
government was unable to adopt a sufficiently liberal constitution, General 
MacArthur decided that the GHQ must provide its own draft.42 
proceeded to draft a new constitution 
43 over a span of eight days and presented it to the Japanese 
                                                 
34 See SHIGENORI MATSUI, supra note 24, at 13; Birth of the Constitution of Japan: Outline: Part 1 
Military Defeat and Efforts to Reform the Constitution, NAT L DIET LIBR., 
http://www.ndl.go.jp/constitution/e/outline/01outline.html (last visited Nov. 25, 2018).  
35 While General MacArthur and by extension his office is usually referred to in U.S. literature 
refers to him and his sta
the Japanese convention. 
36 SHIGENORI MATSUI, supra note 24, at 13 14; see also KOSEKI S , THE BIRTH OF JAPAN S 
POSTWAR CONSTITUTION 7 10 (Ray A. Moore trans., Westview Press 2018) (1989) (describing the 
circumstances where General MacArthur first suggested the need for constitutional revision to Prince 
Konoe Fumimaro). 
37 SHIGENORI MATSUI, supra note 24, at 14. 
38 Id. 
39 See KOSEKI S , supra note 36, at 60 61; cf. id. at 57 60 (comparing the Matsumoto Draft 
with the Meiji Constitution). 
40 In contrast, to the Matsumoto Draft, other groups and scholars did not rely exclusively on the 
Meiji Constitution and did examine foreign constitutions for their drafts. Id. at 62. For an overview of the 
various Japanese drafts, see id. at 26 48. 
41 See id. at 68 69. 
42 See id. at 77; SHIGENORI MATSUI, supra note 24, at 14; Hideo Tanaka, A History of the 
Constitution of Japan of 1946, in THE JAPANESE LEGAL SYSTEM, supra note 24, at 653, 661 (describing the 
criminal). 
43 Memorandum from Charles L. Kades et al. to Chief of GHQ Government Section, Constitution of 
Japan (Feb. 12, 1946), reproduced in Birth of the Constitution of Japan: GHQ Draft, February 13, 1946, 
NAT L DIET LIBR., http://www.ndl.go.jp/constitution/e/shiryo/03/076shoshi.html (last visited Sept. 4, 2018) 
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government on February 15, 1946.44 While the drafters were undoubtedly 
influenced by their own familiarity with the U.S. Constitution,45 the GHQ 
also relied heavily on drafts submitted by Japanese scholars and other 
Japanese authors.46 Despite its rushed nature, the GHQ Draft represented key 
compromises to satisfy Japanese obligations under the Potsdam Declaration 
and the expectations, which may have imposed its own constitutional 
draft should Japan have not adopted one. 47  After the GHQ Draft was 
accepted by the Japanese government,48 work began on translating the draft 
into Japanese,49 and it was published in full on April 17.50 The final election 
under the Meiji Constitution was conducted on April 10,51 and deliberations 
on the GHQ Draft lasted 114 days until it was approved by the Imperial Diet 
on October 7.52  While in the Imperial Diet, the draft underwent several 
                                                                                                                                                 
[hereinafter GHQ Draft]. Many of the documents central to the drafting of the Japanese Constitution are 
Birth of the Constitution of Japan, NAT L DIET 
LIBR., http://www.ndl.go.jp/constitution/e/index.html (last visited Sept. 4, 2018). For ease of reference, 
direct citations to the various documents will be omitted in favor of directing readers to the main exhibit 
pages from which the referenced documents can be accessed. Further specifications will be provided for 
pages that contain multiple documents. 
44 SHIGENORI MATSUI, supra note 24, at 15. While technically accurate, this description fails to fully 
appreciate the co
see KOSEKI S , supra note 36, at 68 94; THEODORE MCNELLY, THE ORIGINS OF JAPAN S 
DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION 55 88 (2000). 
45 The chapter on individual rights in particular was heavily influenced by the U.S. Constitution. See 
MATSUI, supra note 24, at 154. 
46 See KOSEKI S , supra note 36, at 70; SHIGENORI MATSUI, supra note 24, at 18 21; 
MCNELLY, supra note 44, at 98 100; 
January 11, 1946, NAT L DIET LIBR., 
http://www.ndl.go.jp/constitution/e/shiryo/03/060shoshi.html (last visited Sept. 4, 2018) (indicating that the 
ee 
, NAT L DIET LIBR., 
http://www.ndl.go.jp/constitution/e/shiryo/02/052shoshi.html (last updated May 3, 2004) [hereinafter CIA 
Draft]. 
47 See Hideo Tanaka, supra note 42, at 657 58. 
48 See KOSEKI S , supra note 36, at 111 (suggesting that the Japanese government adopted the 
But see id.  
49 For more on this process and substantive changes that resulted from translation of the GHQ Draft, 
see id. at 111 22. 
50 Id. at 133. 
51 Id. at 165. 
52 Id. at 208. That is not to imply that the draft constitution was debated by the full Diet for all 114 
days. Instead, the draft was first examined by the Privy Council over eleven sessions, then sent to a special 
committee for deliberations, followed by nearly a month of secret meetings in a subcommittee for 
incorporating all of the proposed changes. Id. at 168 69; see also Birth of the Constitution of Japan: 
Deliberations in the Imperial Diet, NAT L DIET LIBR., http://www.ndl.go.jp/constitution/e/outline/ 
04outline.html (last visited Sept. 4, 2018). 
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revisions,53 including the so- cle 9.54 The 
new Constitution was promulgated by the Emperor on November 3, 1946, 
and took effect on May 3, 1947.55 One year later, the Diet was provided with 
an opportunity to amend the Constitution, and yet, no action was taken.56 In 
summary, the 1946 Constitution is more properly viewed as a collaborative 
effort, reflecting the ideas of various drafters, both Japanese and American.57 
Focusing more narrowly on the drafting history of Article 96, early 
proposals from the GHQ drafters would have foreclosed any amendment for 
the first ten years or would have explicitly entrenched the provisions on 
individual rights against amendment. 58  The original proposal would also 
have erected much higher thresholds for amendments, requiring a three-
fourths vote in the Diet followed by two-thirds in a public referendum.59 In 
the deletion of those explicit entrenchment provisions from the GHQ Draft.60 
There was one other provision in the GHQ Draft that would have prohibited 
the Diet from overriding Supreme Court decisions on individual rights, 
although it is unclear why that compromise was not included in the final 
Constitution.61 Except for slight changes in language to reflect the decision 
                                                 
53 See KOSEKI S , supra note 36, at 165 88 (discussing Diet deliberations on compulsory 
 
54 See id. at 192 95. The Ashida Amendment arguably allowed for Japan 
for the purpose of self- id. accomplish[ing] the aim 
of the preceding paragraph ; K , art. 9, para. 2. 
55 KOSEKI S , supra note 36, at 208. 
56 See id. at 243 51; SHIGENORI MATSUI, supra note 24, at 21. 
57 See J. Patrick Boyd, , J. ASIA-PAC. STUD., 
Mar. 2014, at 47, 50 51; cf. KOSEKI S , supra note 36, at 4 (describing the 1946 Constitution as a 
SHIGENORI MATSUI, supra note 24, at 21 (rejecting the notion that the Constitution was 
 
58 See MCNELLY, supra note 44, at 73. 
59 Birth of the Constitution of Japan: GHQ Original Draft: Original Drafts of Committee Reports, 
NAT L DIET LIBR., http://www.ndl.go.jp/constitution/e/shiryo/03/147/147_007l.html (last visited Sept. 4, 
2018) (draft of the Committee of the Emperor and Miscellaneous Affairs) (emphasis added).  
60 MCNELLY, supra note 44, at 74. 
61 Id.  
Supreme Court decisions by a two-thirds vote. See GHQ Draft, supra note 43, art. LXXIII. 
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to retain a bicameral legislature,62 the amendment process proposed in the 
final GHQ Draft remained largely unchanged throughout the process.63 
Given this drafting history, it may be tempting to treat General 
tion to remove the proposed entrenchment provisions 
from Article 96 as definitive proof that no limits exist. However, placed in 
context, such a presumption would grossly overstate the actions of a single 
individual who had no other role in the drafting process. Furthermore, it 
would be erroneous to ascribe much weight to any of the 
actions when the drafting process was conducted largely in secret,64 and 
most  drafting the 
1946 Constitution until years after its adoption, due to censorship during the 
Occupation.65 Of course, because the explicit entrenchment provisions were 
never presented to the Japanese government in the first place, it is equally 
true that th adoption of the amendment process contained in the 
GHQ Draft neither confirms nor denies the existence of limits on 
permissible amendments. In light of the similarities between the amendment 
process in the Meiji Constitution and the GHQ Draft, it is equally plausible 
66 Because 
deliberations in the Diet were also conducted in secret, 67  attempting to 
discern . 
Nevertheless, of the few debate records that do exist,68 little mention is made 
of Article 96 or the amendment process.69 
                                                 
62 Compare GHQ Draft, supra note 43, art. XLI, with K , art. 42. There is some indication that 
the unicameral Diet was also intended as a bargaining chip. See KOSEKI S , supra note 36, at 91. 
63 Compare GHQ Draft, supra note 43, art. LXXXIX, with K , art. 96. 
64 See Hideo Tanaka, supra note 24, at 660 n.9. 
65 See KOSEKI S , supra note 36, at 1; cf. MCNELLY, supra note 44, at 86 88 (listing the 
reasons why the GHQ preferred to keep its role in the drafting process a secret). 
66 For glimpses at the various minor modifications to Article 96 that occurred through each round of 
drafting and translation, see 3 S TATSUO, NIHONKOKU K SEIRITSUSHI 32, 89 90, 148, 415, 488 89 
(Sato Isao ed., 1994). Similarities between the Meiji and 1946 Constitutions are addressed next. See infra 
Section II.B. 
67 See KOSEKI S , supra note 36, at 169 (noting that minutes of the secret subcommittee 
meetings were not even released to the public until 1995). 
68 The National D
conducted in the Diet. See Birth of the Constitution of Japan: Records of the Privy Council Committee, 
April to May 1946, NAT L DIET LIBR., http://www.ndl.go.jp/constitution/e/shiryo/04/111_1shoshi.html (last 
visited Sept. 4, 2018); Record of the Examination Committee of Privy Council on the Bill for Revision of 
the Imperial Constitution After the Decision in the 90th Session, October 19, 1946, NAT L DIET LIBR., 
http://www.ndl.go.jp/constitution/e/shiryo/04/129_1shoshi.html (last visited Sept. 4, 2018). 
69 Although the Privy Council had little to say about the amendment process, in its discussion on 
Chapters IX, X, and XI, several members did express a desire to eliminate Chapter X as unnecessary. See 
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This complex drafting history begs the question of whose intent 
controls when interpreting the 1946 Constitution: The foreign Occupation 
forces in the GHQ whose draft became the foundation for the 1946 
Constitution? The government translators who sought to reinsert aspects of 
the Meiji Constitution when preparing the Japanese version of the GHQ 
Draft before the Diet even began deliberations?70 The conservative-majority 
legislature,71 elected before the final government draft was even published, 
that adopted the new Constitution primarily in order to ensure the safety of 
the institution of the Emperor? 72  Or the subsequent legislatures 73  that 
declined to propose any amendments, even when explicitly given the 
chance?74 Unlike the open drafting history of the U.S. Constitution,75 it is 
difficult to draw any specific inferences about contemporary understanding 
of the 1946 Constitution from the statements of these actors. Quite possibly 
the only commonality among the various drafters was a desire to ensure 
76  The 
significance of these similarities to the Meiji Constitution will be examined 
further in Part III. 
                                                                                                                                                 
Birth of the Constitution of Japan: Records of the Privy Council Committee, April to May 1946, NAT L 
DIET LIBR., http://www.ndl.go.jp/constitution/e/shiryo/04/111_1shoshi.html (last visited Sept. 4, 2018) 
(statements of Irie Toshio & Minobe Tatsukichi on May 15, 1946). And yet, Chapter X was adopted intact. 
70 See KOSEKI S , supra note 36, at 111 16; cf. id. at 132 (noting that groups who advocated 
for only minor changes to the Meiji Constitution supported the March 6 Japanese draft, whereas those who 
sought more substantial reform expressed criticism). 
71 See id.  the Liberal Party, 
predecessor of the LDP). 
72 See id. at 166 67. 
73 Perhaps some significance can also be drawn from the fact that the public arguably rebuked the 
ty its first and 
only electoral win in the April 25, 1947 general election, just prior to the new Constitution coming into 
force. See Dai 23-  [The 23rd General Election], S MAINICHI, 
http://showa.mainichi.jp/news/1947/04/23-4701.html (last visited Nov. 24, 2018).  
74 
constitutional review was mandated by the FEC. See Birth of the Constitution of Japan: Far Eastern 
the Review of a New Japanese Constitution, NAT L DIET LIBR., 
http://www.ndl.go.jp/constitution/e/shiryo/05/129shoshi.html (last visited Sept. 4, 2018); MCNELLY, supra 
note 44, at 25 28; cf. KOSEKI S , supra note 36, at 141 61 (catalog
policy clashes with the FEC). 
75 Which included direct public participation in state conventions as well as a rich dialog on the 
functions of the new Constitution in the Federalist Papers. See AMAR, supra note 32, at 14 15. 
76 KOSEKI S , supra note 36
constitution); see also id. 
Japanese legal bureau id. at 57
Principles); id.  
When drafting history is particularly ambiguous, much as with legis
Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 412 n.29 (1971).  
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B. Discerning the Permissible Scope of Amendments from 
Historical Practice 
Before returning to the text of Article 96, historical practice can also 
shed light on potential implicit limitations to the amendment process. While 
many contemporary constitutions77 explicitly place limits on the scope of 
large- 78 nothing within the 1946 Constitution supports such 
a distinction. 79  If anything, the plain text of Article 96 supports the 
contention that the same procedure was intended to apply to all amendments, 
whether total revisions or minor adjustments. 80  Such an understanding 
would coincide with Article V of the U.S. Constitution, which also makes no 
distinction between amendments and revisions.81 
Nevertheless, the format and scope of subsequent amendments can be 
heavily influenced by the format of prior amendments. Thus, when the Bill 
of Rights was adopted by the several states in the process of ratifying the 
U.S. Constitution, those first ten amendments served as a template for all 
future amendments.82 In the Japanese context, however, there have been no 
successful amendments to the Japanese Constitution since its adoption in 
                                                 
77 See Albert, supra note 2, at 667 n.105 (citing Austria, Spain, and Switzerland as examples of 
countries that contain such a distinction and impose differing thresholds). For example, Article 44 of the 
Austrian Constitution prescribes three tiers of amendment: regular constitutional amendments can be 
passed by a two-
 addition to a two-thirds vote of the National Council; 
partial revisions only must follow the referendum process if a one-third of the National Council so requests. 
BUNDES-VERFASSUNGSGESETZ [B-VG] [CONSTITUTION] BGBL No. 1/1930, art. 44(3) (Austria). 
78 
 -
 supra note 2, at 667. 
79 kaisei), and only in three locations. See 
K  art. 7 (Imperial promulgation); id. art. 16 (individual right to petition); id. art. 96 (amendment 
process). Furthermore, no distinction is drawn between smaller, more technical amendments and larger, 
wide-reaching revisions
this fact and noted that even those Japanese political actors opposed to amending the Constitution have not 
contemplated this argument. Albert, supra note 2, at 668 n.111. 
80 Compare B-VG art. 44(3) (imposing the two-thirds vote threshold only for larger revisions), with 
K  art. 96 (requiring a two-thirds vote and public referendum for any amendment). 
81 See U.S. CONST. art. V; United States v. Sprague, 282 U.S. 716, 730 32 (1931) (rejecting an 
argument that amendments to the U.S. Constitution affecting personal liberties must be referred to the 
people instead of passed via ratification by state legislatures). 
82 For some specific examples of recurring structure and language, see U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 
2; id. amend. XIV, § 5; id. amend. XV, § 2; id. amend. XIX, § 2; id. amend. XXVI, § 2. 
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1946.83 The closest Japan has come to amending the 1946 Constitution was 
arguably in 1957 when the LDP-led government established a commission 
to explore potential amendments, and yet, seven years later, those efforts 
resulted in no specific proposals. 84  The sole amendment to the Meiji 
Constitution was the 1946 Constitution itself, which was in fact adopted and 
ratified via the amendment process prescribed by Article 73 of the Meiji 
Constitution:85 
When it has become necessary in future to amend the 
provisions of the present Constitution, a project to that effect 
shall be submitted to the Imperial Diet by Imperial Order. 
In the above case, neither House can open the debate, unless not 
less than two thirds of the whole number of Members are 
present, and no amendment can be passed, unless a majority of 
not less than two thirds of the Members present is obtained.86 
The process itself employs an identical supermajority requirement as that 
contained in Article 96 of the 1946 Constitution.87 Of further interest here is 
that the Meiji Constitution expressly contained two limitations on the 
amendment process. o modification of the Imperial 
House Law shall be required to be submitted to the deliberation of the 
Imperial Diet 88 in essence shielding the Emperor and rules of succession 
from alteration via regular legislation or amendment.89 Article 75 further 
stipulates that [n]o modification can be introduced into the Constitution, or 
into the Imperial House Law, during the time of a Regency. 90 
                                                 
83 Although Japanese politicians have used this fact to argue for amending Article 96, the current 
supra note 2, at 659; see also 
SHIGENORI MATSUI, supra note 24, at 262 65. 
84 See SHIGENORI MATSUI, supra note 24, at 262 63; cf. Repeta & Jones, supra note 11, at 307 
(finding no specific amendment to ever have been officially proposed in the Diet). 
85 See SHIGENORI MATSUI, supra note 24, at 21. 
86 DAI NIHON TEIKOKU K [MEIJI K ] [CONSTITUTION], art. 73 (Japan), 
http://www.ndl.go.jp/constitution/e/etc/c02.html (last visited Sept. 4, 2018). 
87 Key differences from the 1946 Constitution are the lack of any popular referendum requirement 
Compare id., with K , art. 96. 
88 MEIJI K  art. 74. 
89 The Japanese term used here is kaisei Id. 
90 Id. 
while the Emperor is absent or otherwise incapacitated, or until the Emperor comes of age. See Regent, 
MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/regent (last updated Mar. 20, 2018); 
see also K  art. 5 (describing the effects of a regency); K shitsu tenpan [Imperial House Law], Law No. 
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The question then is whether amendment  can rewrite the entire 
Constitution. By historical practice it did, so the answer must be yes. 91 
However, this exception can be interpreted both broadly and 
narrowly. Broadly speaking, the 1946 Constitution overwrote the Meiji 
Constitution in its entirety including its primary structural pillar of placing 
the Emperor as the sovereign92 while nominally following the procedures 
in Article 73.93 This precedent would suggest that if a new  constitution is 
proposed, it need merely attain the minimum requirements of an ordinary 
amendment to effectively replace the current Constitution in its entirety.94 
However, such a broad reading overlooks certain facts that tend to 
undercut the apparent logic in its simplicity. For example, the same basic act 
of rewriting the entire Constitution could only be accomplished otherwise by 
individually amending each provision, a process that would be impeded by 
any explicit or implicit limits to the amendment process itself. Such a 
allow more time for deliberation of every single provision prior to enactment. 
While neither Constitution explicitly forbids the consideration of multiple 
amendments at the same time, no provision expressly provides that such 
lesser 
amendments.95 Furthermore, historical context played an immeasurable role 
                                                                                                                                                 
3 of 1947, art. 16 (requiring a regent when the Emperor is a minor or when the Emperor is mentally or 
physically unable to perform the required duties). 
91 This oversimplifies the debate over the legitimacy of the act of promulgating an entirely new 
constitution as an amendment. For a summary of Japanese scholarly theories on the significance of this 
enactment history, see infra Section II.D.3. 
92  See, e.g., MEIJI K  art. 4 (Japan) (designating the Emperor as the sovereign and head of Japan). 
93 
Birth of the Constitution 
of Japan: The Constitution of Japan, NAT L DIET LIBR., http://www.ndl.go.jp/constitution/e/etc/c01.html 
(last visited Sept. 4, 2018). 
94 
See Repeta & Jones, supra note 11, 
at 304; SHIGENORI MATSUI, supra note 24, at 264. For an overview of recent efforts to draft a new 
constitution, see CHRISTIAN G. WINKLER, THE QUEST FOR JAPAN S NEW CONSTITUTION: AN ANALYSIS OF 
VISIONS AND CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM PROPOSALS 1980 2009, at 94 133 (2011). For a comparison of 
-
ta
-taihi.pdf. 
Interestingly, the initial 2004 LDP draft outline suggested amending Article 96 to provide two pathways for 
adopting amendments: either with a two-thirds vote in both houses and no public referendum, or with a 
simple majority in both houses followed by a simple majority in a public referendum. Id. at 24. 
95 Thi
and is can be expressly found in other near-contemporaneous constitutions. See, e.g., CONSTITUCIÓN 
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in prompting the adoption of  in Japan. The Meiji 
Constitution was the ultimate fruit of years of civil war followed by efforts 
to abolish the prior feudal system and to reinstate the Emperor as the leader 
of a unified Japan,96 while the 1946 Constitution came as a direct result of 
97 These two constitutions 
arose amid similar circumstances equivalent to revolutions, complete with 
shifts in the locus of sovereign power from the Tokugawa shogunate to the 
Emperor, and then from the Emperor to the people. Some may suggest that, 
absent such revolutionary circumstances, a complete constitutional revision 
would be impermissible.98  
amendment exception is unlikely to garner much support from the courts.99 
Progressively narrower readings would posit that even a wholesale  
rewriting of the Constitution, while permissible via the regular amendment 
process, must still abide by those limits already placed on the amendment 
process. In the case of the Meiji Constitution, the only applicable explicit 
limit100 on the constitutional amendment process in Article 73 was that no 
                                                                                                                                                 
ESPAÑOLA [C.E.] [CONSTITUTION] B.O.E. n. 168, Dec. 29, 1978 (Spain) (requiring additional procedures 
 
96 See SHIGENORI MATSUI, supra note 24, at 7 10. 
97 See id. at 12 16. 
98 See, e.g., MILLER, supra note 9, at 288 (attributing anti-
p
the works of political theorists such as Carl Schmidt); id. 
constitution] has as its premise the basic upheaval in our political structure brought by our acceptance of 
the Potsdam Declaration terms . . . [and] it is only on this basis that it can be thought to be constitutionally 
MIYAZAWA TOSHIYOSHI, KOKUMIN SHUKEN NO TEN [POPULAR SOVEREIGNTY 
AND THE EMPEROR SYSTEM] 93 94 (1957)); cf. MASATOMO KODAMA, THE DAWN OF A NEW 
CONSTITUTION 96 (Carl Freire trans., 2015) (likening the situation surrounding the adoption of the 1946 
MILLER, supra note 9, at 276 (discussing the August Revolution 
MINOBE TATSUKICHI, NIHONKOKU K [PRINCIPLES 
OF THE JAPANESE CONSTITUTION] 118 19 (1948)). 
99 To be clear, Albert approaches this theoretical limitation on the amendment process as a question 
of political practice to be self-governed by political actors themselves. However, there is no indication, if 
or for that matter 
that it would not be judicially enforceable. The ultimate 
measure is legitimacy of the processes in the eyes of the people, which arguably may fall under some 
broader conception of what procedures are required, which would be judicially reviewable. 
100 Notably, of the 
Constitution except  MEIJI K  pmbl. 
The Japanese word used here is funk , essentially meaning to recklessly alter or revise in a disorderly 
fashion. See Funk , KOTOBANKU, https://kotobank.jp/word/ -623136 (last visited Mar. 26, 2018). See 
Section II.D.3 for further discussion of the importance of the Preamble. 
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amendment may take place while a regency is in effect.101 As this was not an 
issue when the 1946 Constitution was promulgated,102 it is arguable that the 
wholesale  revision of the Constitution in 1946 was permissible because it 
complied not only with the literal amendment process in Article 73 but with 
the explicit restrictions in Article 75 as well.103 At its absolute narrowest, the 
historical exception for a wholesale  revision would further be limited to 
only those extreme circumstances that brought about the Meiji Constitution 
in 1889 and the 1946 Constitution.104 Such a reading essentially restates the 
truism that no constitutional provision . . . can survive revolution. 105 
Without delving too deeply into either extreme, it would appear that a 
middle-of-the-road approach would best encapsulate the scope of this 
historical exception Constitution must 
follow the same processes and restrictions as the amendment 
process, similar to what occurred in 1946. However, faced with a revolution 
or some other exigent crisis, even explicitly entrenched provisions may pose 
no barrier to total constitutional revision. Applying this approach to the 
proposed LDP Draft, 106  it becomes clear that, barring some particularly 
extreme circumstances,  at the very least must 
comply with any textual limitations to the amendment process. Part III will 
attempt to uncover what those implicit or explicit limits might be. 
                                                 
101 MEIJI K  art. 75. Because the Imperial House Law was itself not at issue, the other explicit 
limit on the amendment power was not in play. See id. art. 74. 
102 See Birth of the 
Constitution of Japan, supra note 93. 
103 
f 1889 now 
existing . . . .
Constitution Draft, June 21, 1946, NAT L DIET LIBR., http://www.ndl.go.jp/constitution/e/shiryo/04/ 
116shoshi.html (last visited Sept. 4, 2018). 
104 Ironically, this argument encapsulated by the August Revolution theory is precisely the 
majority view among scholars in Japan. See discussion infra Section II.D.3. 
105 Richard Albert, The Unamendable Core of the United States Constitution, in COMPARATIVE 
PERSPECTIVES ON THE FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 13, 14 n.8. (András Koltay ed., 2015), 
lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1985&context=lsfp. 
106 With a two-
c
approach should public opinion hold steady. But see Hiroyuki Tanaka & Hiroshi Odanaka, Ruling Bloc to 
Put Off Plan to Pass Bill to Revise Constitutional Referendum Act, MAINICHI (July 4, 2018), 
https://mainichi.jp/english/articles/20180704/p2a/00m/0na/032000c (discussing a setback in revising the 
referendum procedures for proposed amendments). 
January 2019 Implicit Limits on Amending the Japanese Constitution 261 
C. The Availability of Judicial Review to Invalidate an Allegedly 
Unconstitutional Constitutional Amendment 
Another barrier to challenging the constitutionality of an amendment 
is the constitutional scope of judicial review.107 The power of judicial review 
is expressly enshrined in Article 81 of the 1946 Constitution
Court is the court of last resort with power to determine the constitutionality 
of any law, order, regulation or official act 108 The term shobun, translated 
usually involving the application of law to facts in order to determine how 
something or someone should be dealt with.109 The only other instance of the 
term shobun is in Article 78, which prohibi  action against 
110 A necessary corollary to 
Article 81 is the Supremacy Clause in Article 98, which no 
law, ordinance, imperial rescript or other act of government, or part thereof, 
contrary to the [Constitution], shall have legal force or validity. 111 A key 
difference here is the much more expansive  
clause, which would reach any other or a much broader term 
susceptible to circular definition even in Japanese. 112  The term  also 
appears in several other provisions.113 Of course, because the Diet has never 
proposed an amendment to begin with, there is no precedent from the 
Supreme Court that clearly answers whether one would be reviewable as an 
114 
                                                 
107 Although Albert dismissed judicial review as an option to challenge an amendment to Article 96, 
his analysis presumed the constitutional availability of judicial review for an amendment, and his dismissal 
was based on the likelihood that Japanese courts would exercise judicial constraint based on prudential 
concerns. See Albert, supra note 2, at 672. This Comment is less concerned with whether a court will 
exercise its power which depends more on the composition of the Supreme Court than whether it can.  
108 K art. 81 (emphasis added). 
109 See Shobun, KOTOBANKU, https://kotobank.jp/word/ -535108 (last visited Mar. 26, 2018). 
110 K  art. 78 (emphasis added). 
111 Id. art. 98. 
112 See , KOTOBANK, https://kotobank.jp/word/ -61390 (last visited Mar. 26, 2018) (meaning 
, 
with a particular focus on criminal law, see Okamura Harunobu,  [The Basis 
of Act Theory in Criminal Law], 29 T L. REV. 1, 2 (1986), http://id.nii.ac.jp/1060/00003588/. 
113 See K arts. 3, 4, 5, 7, 17, 20, 39. 
114 One interesting side note in assessing the intended scope of judicial review in Japan is the fact that 
the GHQ Draft contained a provision that would have allowed the Diet to overrule a Supreme Court 
decision with a supermajority vote, and yet that provision was not included in the final text of the 1948 
Constitution. See THEODORE MCNELLY, THE ORIGINS OF JAPAN S DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION 74 (2000); 
Hideo Tanaka, A History of the Constitution of Japan of 1946, in THE JAPANESE LEGAL SYSTEM, supra 
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The Sunakawa case115 is instructive in this instance not only because it 
involves Article 9 and the birth of the political question doctrine116 in Japan, 
but because it involves a constitutional challenge to a treaty, judicial review 
of which is not addressed in either Article 81 or 98.117 Instead, treaties are 
mentioned in the second paragraph of Article 98, stipulating 
treaties concluded by Japan and established laws of nations shall be 
faithfully observed. 118 This special treatment has prompted some scholars 
to argue that treaties are therefore superior to the Constitution itself, or at 
least supersede any statutes in conflict.119 The answer to whether treaties are 
reviewable, thus, may bear on the question of whether a court could 
potentially review a constitutional amendment. 
The Sunakawa case involved a constitutional challenge to a criminal 
law enacted to enforce provisions of the Japan-United States Security 
Treaty if the treaty itself violated Article 9, then so did those criminal 
provisions. A unanimous Court albeit with multiple concurring opinions
held the question of whether the treaty was in accord with the 
Constitution was carefully discussed by both Houses and finally ratified by 
the Diet as being a legal and proper treaty. 120 extremely high 
degree of political consideration, having bearing upon the very existence of 
[Japan] as a sovereign power,  the Court declared that, unless the said 
                                                                                                                                                 
note 42, at 37 n.6. One possibility for the initial inclusion of this option was a general distrust among U.S. 
scholars and politicians at the time of activist courts overturning beneficial legislation. See MCNELLY, 
supra, at 74; cf, Sujit Choudhry, The Lochner Era and Comparative Constitutionalism, 2 INT L J. CONST. L. 
upo Lochner-era jurisprudence). Although it is 
possible that these concerns may have been alleviated by the other restrictions imposed on judicial 
appointees. See K art. 79, para. 2 (providing for popular review of appointments); id. para. 5 (affixing 
a mandatory retirement age). 
115 See THE JAPANESE LEGAL SYSTEM, supra note 24, at 709 11 (summarizing the background facts 
and majority opinion). 
116 For an in-depth explanation and critical examination 
, see generally Chen & Wada, supra note 30. 
117 In contrast, the Supremacy Clause as initially proposed by committee prior to completion of the 
the Land, and no law, ordinance, treaty or other governmental act contrary to the provisions thereof shall 
Birth of the Constitution of Japan: GHQ Original Draft: Original Drafts of 
Committee Reports, supra note 59 (emphasis added) (draft of the Committee of the Emperor and 
Miscellaneous Affairs). 
118 K art. 98, para. 2. 
119 See SHIGENORI MATSUI, supra note 24, at 28 29 (noting that most scholars agree with the second 
contention). 
120 Sakata v. Japan, Sup. Ct. Dec. 16, 1959, Sh  34 (a) no. 710, 13 K  3225, 3234, translated in 
1959 (A) (710), SUP. CT. JAPAN, http://www.courts.go.jp/app/hanrei_en/detail?id=13 (last visited Nov. 24, 
2018) [hereinafter Sunakawa].  
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treaty is obviously unconstitutional and void, it falls outside the purview of 
the power of judicial review granted to the court. 121 In the normal sense 
the determination of  constitutionality 
should be left primarily to the Cabinet which has the power to conclude 
treaties and the Diet which has the power to ratify them; and ultimately to 
the political consideration of the people with whom rests the sovereign 
power of the nation. 122 Because the security treaty in question was not 
unconstitutional,  the Court exercised judicial restraint under its 
political question doctrine and stopped short of reaching the merits. 
 81, the 
Sunakawa Court nevertheless concluded that even highly political treaties 
obviously unconstitutional and void
As the concurring opinion of Justice Tarumi acknowledged, the majority in 
fact did engage in a superficial review if only to determine whether further 
inquiry was required.123 The Court did not, however, specify how it is that 
treaties fall under the penumbra of judicial review. In fact, the majority 
opinion did not discuss judicial review under Article 81 even once.124 Some 
justices indicated that treaties, being indistinguishable in effect from laws 
insofar as domestic application is concerned, would fall under the term 
as utilized in Article 81.125 Justice Kotani, on the other hand, would 
have recognized a power of judicial review commensurate with that 
exercised by federal courts in the United States, after which the Japanese 
126 Because the majority opinion and all of the 
                                                 
121 Id. at 3235. 
122 Id. 
123 
the power to conduct substantive investigation for the sake of formality . . . to determine whether or not it 
Id. at 3258 (Tarumi, J., concurring). 
ordi
Id. at 3256. 
124 Article 81 is first mentioned in the concurring opinion of Justices Fujita and Irie. Id. at 3246 
(Fujita & Irie, JJ., concurring). 
125 
for judicial review of all la Id. at 3280 (Okuno & Takahashi, JJ., 
concurring); Justice Shima expressed even less aversion to judicial review, noting that the Court need only 
 improper compared with the 
Id. at 3245 (Shima, J., concurring). 
126 
provision which directly confers the power of judicial review but that such a power intrinsically exists in 
the court which is bound by the Constitution and the laws. According to this, Article 81 is reduced to a 
provision which merely stipulates that the Supreme Court is the court of last resort with regard to reviewing 
Id. at 3273 (Kotani, J., concurring); Justice Kotani adopted this broad 
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concurring opinions were unanimous in that even the most politically 
sensitive treaties are reviewable under certain circumstances, the Sunakawa 
case at the very least does not preclude the contention that a constitutional 
amendment, applicable domestically and not involving sensitive negotiations 
with a foreign sovereign, would also be judicially reviewable. 
Nevertheless, some attempt should be made to harmonize the 
Sunakawa holding on the appropriate level of deference due to 
treaties on the one hand and the text of the Constitution on the other, to 
apparent 
differential in scope between Articles 81 and 98. While Article 81 vests the 
ower to determine the constitutionality of any 
law, order, regulation or official act 127 the question remains of who can 
imperial rescript or other act of government that 
is nevertheless unconstitutional under Article 98.128 The short answer, as 
he whole judicial power is vested in 
a Supreme Court 129 he Supreme Court is the court of last resort. 130 
the concept of superiority of the 
judiciary 131  Justices Okuno and Takahashi 
briefly attempted to address this apparent discrepancy, concluding only that 
t
included in paragraph 1, Article 98, it does not come under the Constitution 
132 Indeed, under the 
general canon of construction that individual provisions should be 
interpreted in harmony with one another, 133  Articles 81 and 98 are best 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
Id. at 3277.  
127 K art. 81 (emphasis added). 
128 Both Japanese term meirei. See id. 
arts. 81, 98. 
129 Id. art. 76, para. 1; cf. id. para. 2 
 
130 Id. art. 81. 
131 Sunakawa, supra note 120, at 3246 (Fujita & Irie, JJ., concurring). 
132 Id. at 3281 (Okuno & Takahashi, JJ., concurring). 
133 See LACKLAND H. BLOOM, JR., METHODS OF INTERPRETATION: HOW THE SUPREME COURT READS 
THE CONSTITUTION 36 (2009). Contemporaneous statements from the GHQ drafters confirm that the 1946 
Constitution was intended to be viewed as a whole. See Hideo Tanaka, A History of the Constitution of 
Japan of 1946, in THE JAPANESE LEGAL SYSTEM, supra note 42
Constitution as written is basic. . .  
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understood as providing non-exhaustive lists to illustrate the broad reach of 
the Court s power of judicial review.134 
Delving further into the constitutional text, however, reveals that the 
slight differences between the two lists indicate separate conceptions of the 
breadth of judicial review. Applying the common maxims of noscitur a 
sociis and ejusdem generis,135 Article 81 appears to provide a list of those 
presumptively reviewable acts of government in order of diminishing 
formality . 136 Article 98, in contrast, lists items 
differing in kind  under 
Chapter IV of the Constitution; an action by the 
executive branch under Chapter V; imperial obviously emanating 
from the Emperor, although that power no longer exists in Chapter I of the 
1946 Constitution; while the gener would 
arguably extend to any action performed by any other manifestation of 
governmental authority under the remaining Chapters of the Constitution.137 
This would undoubtedly include local ordinances, or , issued by local 
- 138 Read in 
                                                 
134 This understanding is supported by the GHQ 
Birth of the Constitution of Japan: GHQ Original Draft: Ellerman Notes on Minutes of Government 
Section, Public Administration Division Meetings and Steering Committee Meetings Between 5 February 
and 12 February Inclusive, NAT L DIET LIBR., http://www.ndl.go.jp/constitution/e/shiryo/03/ 
147shoshi.html (last visited Sept. 4, 2018). 
135 See Noscitur a sociis, BLACK S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) 
word or phrase ; Ejusdem generis, 
BLACK S LAW DICTIONARY, supra  of specifics, the 
 Similar 
principles for ascertaining meaning from surrounding terms apply in Japanese interpretation. See Hirano 
Toshihiko, Sono ta  heiretsu sono ta no  reiji  [ Et Cetera
An Exegesis of Legal Terminology Part 1], 9 HIROSHIMA L. REV. 87 (2013), 
https://ir.lib.hiroshima-u.ac.jp/files/public/3/34433/2014101620204869106/HiroshimaLawRev_9_87.pdf. 
136 K art. 81. id. arts. 56, 59; 
agreement among the Cabinet, id. art. , or kisoku, potentially referring to procedural rules 
that can be established by courts or the Diet to govern their own actions, id. arts. 58, 77; and any other 
see id. 
[for] damage through illegal act of any public official Sup. Ct. July 7, 1948, K  
801, 808  
137 K art. 98; cf. M  385, 391, 
http://www.courts.go.jp/app/files/hanrei_jp/161/052161_hanrei.pdf [hereinafter Ishizuka] (interpreting the 
residual clause as reaching any exercise of public authority with similar characteristics to the listed items, 
)). For background 
on the Ishizuka case, see SHIGENORI MATSUI, supra note 24, at 242 43. 
138 K art. 94; see also Sunakawa, supra note 120, at 3272 
the Constitution there is not a thread of doubt that such 
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conjunction, all governmental actions, regardless of formality or source of 
power, are therefore subject to judicial review, and there is no reason why 
this rationale would not also extend to Chapter IX Amendments.  
At first glance, such an interpretation of the wide breadth of judicial 
review would seem to contradict the Sunakawa principle that some treaties 
are beyond the Court s reach. Despite appearances, these results are not 
actually in conflict, and the Sunakawa Court s holding can be reconciled 
with the text of the Constitution. Article 98 s residual clause extends to any 
),139 which is undoubtedly a 
broad term under which nearly any conceivable governmental action might 
fall. Most notably, Article 7 supports this broad reading in delineating those 
) to be performed by the Emperor, 
which includes 140 
The near identical terminology used in the Japanese text is illuminating in 
this respect kokumu ro state affairs 141 and kokuji as 
142  However, other provisions of the Constitution shed 
light on the intended distinction between these terms.143 In particular, Article 
72 uses kokumu 
relations, or .144 The term kokuji only used in the Constitution to 
145 can be understood as supplying the 
                                                                                                                                                 
id. at 3280 81 (Okuno & Takahashi, JJ., concurring) (comparing 
reviewability of local ordinances to treaties). 
139 K art. 98. This Japanese translation of what would become Article 98 was changed during the 
 One key distinction on which the 
Supreme Court has spoken is that the act in question must be governmental in nature, so when the 
government is acting as an individual such as by purchasing land to build a Self-Defense Force base it 
does not fall within the reach of Article 98. Ishizuka, supra note 137, at 391. 
140 K art. 7. 
141 See Kokumu, KOTOBANKU, https://kotobank.jp/jeword/  (last visited Nov. 24, 2018); see also 
K  id.  
142 Kokuji, KOTOBANKU, https://kotobank.jp/jeword/  (last visited Nov. 24, 2018). 
143 Under the widely accepted canon of construction, words used in a constitution are presumed to 
have the same meaning throughout. BLOOM, supra note 133, at 31. Correspondingly, where a different term 
is used, it is reasonable to believe a different meaning is intended. See id. at 451 n.6. How a term is used 
elsewhere within the text can further aide in determining its proper meaning. See Akhil Reed Amar, 
Intratextualism, 112 HARV. L. REV. 747, 748 (1999). 
144 K  art. 72 (emphasis added) The Prime Minister . . . reports on general national affairs and 
foreign relations to the Diet . . . . 
145 Id. arts. 3, 4, 5, 7.  
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146 Affairs of state (kokumu) and foreign relations 
( ), therefore, each comprise a subset of the overall panoply of potential 
governmental activities. 
Because Article 98 utilizes the term kokumu in extending 
), this can be interpreted as only 
precluding judicial review for those decisions involving foreign affairs 
( ) 
representatives,147 l  under the Sunakawa 
standard. On the other hand, judicial review would be presumptively 
available for all other domestic acts.148 Such a reading would provide a 
textual hook within the Constitution to support the Sunakawa decision149 and 
-established political question doctrine.150 The Constitution 
of Japan being a document of domestic application, amendments should then 
be co  subservient to the Constitution under 
Article 98, and in turn, subject to judicial review under Article 81. 
This is not to imply that Article 98 confers a separate power of 
judicial review on the Supreme Court beyond that contained in Article 81 or 
that a constitutional amendment by itself could be challenged in court. 
Instead, Article 98 adds dimensional perspective to the reach of judicial 
review authorized under Article 81. Another constitutional limit not yet 
                                                 
146 Id. art. 7. 
147 
vested in the Cabinet. K art. 72, para. 1, cl. 2. This coincides with the general understanding of the 
See United 
States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319 (1936). 
148 Some sch 2 HIGUCHI Y ICHI ET AL., 
CH SHAKU NIHONKOKU KENP  [THE ANNOTATED CONSTITUTION OF JAPAN] 1485 (1984 I]ssai no 
 . . . ), in turn, includes constitutions, and would equally 
extend to amendments. See , KOTOBANKU, https://kotobank.jp/word/ -499793 (last visited May 
25, 2018). Of course, because the Constitution of Japan has never actually been amended, much of the 
work in this area is purely theoretical. In the absence of definitive interpretations from the Supreme Court, 
the best course is to rely on the constitutional text. 
149 
that particular s -changing 
Sunakawa, supra note 120, at 3248
49 (Fujita & Irie, JJ., concurring). This, along with the other concurrences, suggests that whether foreign 
policy is involved, as opposed to purely domestic policy, may be the determining factor on the question of 
reviewability. 
150 See, e.g., Tomabechi v. Japan, Sup. Ct. June 8, 1960, Sh  30 (o) no.96, 14 MINSH  1206, 1210, 
http://www.courts.go.jp/app/hanrei_en/detail?id=14 (declining to review the highly political decision to 
dissolve the House of Representatives); Chen & Wada, supra note 30, at 352 & n.22; Shigenori Matsui, 
supra note 30, at 1387 88 (discussing the political question doctrine). 
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discussed is that any attempt to challenge an amendment would still need to 
comply with 151 For example, a 
justiciable case could potentially exist when an official acts or refuses to act 
under a law passed pursuant to an allegedly unconstitutional amendment.152 
Even though the preceding analysis clarifies that no constitutional barriers 
prevent courts from reviewing a challenged amendment, the Court may still 
fashion prudential limits to review. 153  As Albert and many other 
commentators have recognized, 154  Japanese courts are considered to be 
generally conservative and unlikely to interfere in areas of policy that are 
better left to the discretion of the elected branches, such as economic 
policies, social rights, and election laws. 155  A question that cannot be 
answered is whether the Court will nevertheless fashion a similar prudential 
barrier to review for the content of a constitutional amendment. While there 
is at least some textual support in the Constitution counseling against 
premature judicial review for the contents of treaties, as well as for laws 
pertaining to elections and social welfare programs,156 similar language is 
not present regarding amendments. Although Article 96 does proclaim that 
all amendments  
the means of public referendum, this merely speaks to amendment procedure, 
                                                 
151 
nevertheless held that such a requirement was a precursor to the exercise of judicial power under Article 76, 
which in turn is a precursor to judicial review for the constitutionality of a statute under Article 81. See 
Shigenori Matsui, supra note 30, at 1379 (discussing the standing doctrine in the National Police Reserve 
case). 
152 The Sunakawa case is also instructive because the Court only considered the availability of 
judicial review for a treaty when it was necessary to determine the validity of a criminal statute enacted to 
enforce provisions of the underlying treaty. See THE JAPANESE LEGAL SYSTEM, supra note 42, at 709.  
153 Other constitutional limits that the Supreme Court of Japan has recognized include immunities 
from suit under treaties and international law, as well as cases that the Constitution itself places outside the 
realm of judicial review, such as impeachment. See K arts. 55, 64; ASHIBE NOBOYOSHI, K [THE 
CONSTITUTION] 331 (5th ed. 2011). An example in U.S. law of a mixed constitutional-and-prudential 
doctrine would be mootness, which is not wholly mandated under the U.S. Constitution. See CONG. 
RESEARCH SERV., RS22599, MOOTNESS: AN EXPLANATION OF THE JUSTICIABILITY DOCTRINE 3 5 (2007). 
154 See Albert, supra note 2, at 671; Haley, supra note 30, at 1467; Shigenori Matsui, supra note 30, 
at 1375. 
155 See ASHIBE NOBOYOSHI, supra note 153, at 332. Using election law as an example, although 
judicial review may be precluded on discretionary determinations of where to draw borders for voting 
districts, such policies have been declared unconstitutional when violating basic concepts such as equality 
under the law. See K  
Somers Bailey, , 
6 PAC. RIM L. & POL Y J. 169, 175 (1997). 
156 See K art. 73, para. 1, cl. 2 3 
for id. atters pertaining to the method of 
); id. 
endeavors for the promotion and extension o  
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not content.157 To reiterate, nothing in the Constitution bars judicial review 
of amendments, assuming a valid case or controversy is brought before the 
Court. Whether or not the Court will actually exercise its power is a separate 
question that is beyond the scope of this Comment. 
D. Scholarly Opinions and Foreign Judicial Decisions on Implicit 
Limits to the Amendment Process 
1. Lessons from Can Be 
Applied to the Japanese Constitution, Even If the 
Doctrine Itself Cannot 
Although the Constitution of Japan benefits from a specific textual 
provision  ability to invalidate an otherwise 
properly promulgated act of the legislative branch, not every constitution 
clearly recognizes the power of judicial review. 158  Nevertheless, various 
courts across the globe have at times taken it upon themselves to exercise 
powers not explicitly granted under their respective constitutions to prevent 
the abuses of governmental actors, even to the point of invalidating 
constitutional amendments.159 T
doctrine is possibly the earliest and most well known instance of this 
notion.160 
the constitution that provides for an amendment process, the ability to 
amend the constitution must be limited to those actions that would not 
destroy its . 161 In fact, this understanding is nearly identical 
                                                 
157 Thus far, this Comment has been concerned with the reviewability of a constitutional challenge to 
the content of an amendment procedural challenges are presumptively justiciable. Cf. U.S. v. Sprague, 
282 U.S. 716 (1931) (exercising jurisdiction over procedural and substantive challenges to the validity of 
the Eighteenth Amendment). See infra Section II.D.2 
views on the availability of judicial review for constitutional amendments. The Sunakawa Court also 
that it comported with the process in Article 73. Sunakawa, supra note 120, at 3236. 
158 For example, the U.S. Constitution does not explicitly provide for the power of judicial review, 
and yet Chief Justice Marshall found such a power implied in the grants of judicial power and original 
jurisdiction under Article III. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 173 74 (1803). Cf. U.S. CONST. art. III, §§ 
1 2, with K art. 81 (explicitly providing for judicial review). 
159 See, e.g., Po Jen Yap, Constitutional Fig Leaves in Asia, 25 WASH. INT L L.J. 421, 444 45 (2016) 
 
160 Albert, supra note 2, at 669 71. Although Albert ultimately dismisses the possibility that Japanese 
courts will follow a similar route. Id. at 671. 
161 See id.  Judicial 
Supremacy in Comparative Constitutional Law, 92 TUL. L. REV. 393, 414 28 (2017). 
270 WASHINGTON INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL VOL. 28 NO. 1 
to the views ascribed to by many Japanese constitutional scholars,162 and as 
such, may be useful in determining how the Supreme Court of Japan could 
approach a similar controversy. 
Unlike the broad language in Articles 81 and 98 of the Japanese 
Constitution, Article 13 of the Indian Constitution 
in such a manner so as to arguably preclude review of amendments.163 
Nevertheless, the Indian Supreme Court reasoned that allowing the Indian 
distort [the 
constitution] out of recognition . . . [by] demolish[ing] the very pillars on 
which the preamble rests 164 
doctrine to strike down an amendment that would have removed any implicit 
he donee 
of a limited power cannot by the exercise of that power convert the limited 
power into an unlimited 165 Although the particulars of the amendment 
process under the Indian Constitution are immediately distinguishable from 
the situation in Japan,166 the approach taken by the Indian Supreme Court in 
identifying the contours of limits to the amendment power is instructive. 
In particular, when first announcing the doctrine in Kesavananda 
Bharati v. State of Kerala
structural approach to interpretation,  considering not only the 
the preamble, the directive principles, and 
the non-inclusion in Article: 368 167 
Based on these sources, the Court concluded that the  
                                                 
162 See, e.g., ASHIBE NOBOYOSHI, supra note 153, at 385 88 (describing the three pillars of the 
Constitution of Japan popular sovereignty, individual rights, and pacifism with particular note of the 
Preamble as placing those pillars outside of Article 96); John M. Maki, The Constitution of Japan: Pacifism, 
Popular Sovereignty, and Fundamental Human Rights, 53 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 73 (1990); see also 
discussion infra Section II.D.3. Nevertheless, those views falter under the same criticisms
supra note 2, at 670 (discussing criticisms of the 
 
163 See INDIA CONST. art. 13, § law made in contravention of this clause shall, to the extent 
 (emphasis added); id. § this article ordinance, 
order, bye-law, rule, regulation, notification, custom or usage . . . .  
164 Minerva Mills Ltd. v. Union of India, (1981) 1 SCR 206, 240 (India). 
165 Id. 
166 For example, Article 368 of the Indian Constitution does not require every amendment to be 
submitted to popular referendum. INDIA CONST. art. 368, § 2. Furthermore, amendments to certain Articles 
and Chapters of the Constitution were specifically entrenched and further required the approval of a 
majority of the state legislatures. Thus, the Indian Supreme Court was justified in concluding that 
See Kesavananda Bharati v. 
State of Kerala, (1973) 4 S.C.C. 225, 393 (India); Mate, supra note 161, at 418. 
167 Mate, supra note 161, at 418. 
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Indian Constitution rested on five unamendable pillars. 168  Although the 
Kesavananda , 
which accounts for a majority of those five pillars,169 its structural analysis 
allowed the Court to look beyond the plain text of Article 368 to ascertain 
how various provisions interact with one another. As the doctrine evolved, a 
framework emerged for identifying whether a feature was part of the 
purpose, its 
placement within the overall constitutional scheme, and 
170 
Courts in other countries have also adopted judicial review of 
constitutional amendments similar to the 
but only under similar circumstances. In Taiwan, for example, there are no 
appreciable checks and balances on the National Assembly  ability to 
amend the Constitution.171 Owing to this peculiar imbalance, the Judicial 
Yuan the constitutional 
amendment proceedings must especially abide by the due process to ensure 
that the will of the public is indeed fully taken into consideration. 172 Based 
on that reasoning, the Judicial Yuan invalidated a constitutional amendment 
that was enacted by anonymous vote as violating constitutional principles of 
transparency.173 Courts in Brazil, the Czech Republic, Germany, Italy, South 
Africa, and Turkey have also adopted a similar ctrine of 
some sort in response to too-lenient amendment barriers.174 However, not 
every court considering the doctrine has accepted its premise.175 
                                                 
168 Those five principles are the constitutional supremacy, republican form of government, secularism, 
separation of powers, and federalist principles. Id. (quoting Kesavananda, 4 SCC at 274). 
169 See INDIA CONST. 
India into a SOVEREIGN SOCIALIST SECULAR DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC . . .  
170 Mate, supra note 161, at 421 (quoting Indira Nehru Gandhi v. Shri Raj Narain, (1975) Supp. SCC 
1, 252 (India)). 
171 See MINGUO XIANFA [CONSTITUTION], arts. 72, 127 (1947) (Taiwan). 
172 Judicial Yuan [J.Y.] Interpretation No. 499, DAFAGUAN JIESHI [JIESHI] (Const. Ct. Mar. 24, 2000) 
(Taiwan), http://www.judicial.gov.tw/constitutionalcourt/EN/p03_01.asp?expno=499. 
173 See id.; Richard Albert, Constitutional Amendment and Dismemberment, 43 YALE J. INT L L. 1, 17 
(2018).  
174 See generally Richard Albert, Nonconstitutional Amendments, 22 CAN. J.L. & JURIS. 5, 21 31 
(2009) (discussing India, South Africa, and Germany); Yaniv Roznai, Unconstitutional Constitutional 
Amendments: The Migration and Success of a Constitutional Idea, 61 AM. J. COMP. L. 657, 677 713 
(2013) (discussing Brazil, Italy, Turkey, and many other Latin American, European, and Asian countries); 
Vincent J. Samar, Can a Constitutional Amendment Be Unconstitutional?, 33 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 667, 
727 35 (2008) (discussing Germany, India, Argentina, and Nepal). 
175 See Yvonne Tew, On the Uneven Journey to Constitutional Redemption: The Malaysian Judiciary 
and Constitutional Politics, 25 WASH. INT L L. J. 
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T also appears to contradict the 
applicability of such a doctrine. For example, the Fourteenth Amendment is 
commonly viewed as having 
achieve the goals of Reconstruction. 176  Because Article V of the U.S. 
Constitution subjects all varieties of amendment to the same rigorous 
process,177 the legitimacy of even such a fundamental revision is hardly 
questionable.178 Likewise, 
 founding document, such a 
doctrine would seem inapposite to the Constitution of Japan.179 Nevertheless, 
one obvious parallel 
Japanese scholarship on the limits of Article 96 is their reliance on the text 
of the Preamble.180 More important, however, is the fact that the Indian 
Supreme Court has routinely employed a broader structural analysis to 
uncover implicit limits on the amendment power. At the very least, such an 
approach may prove useful for illuminating limits on the scope of Article 96. 
This analytical framework will be explored further in Parts III and IV. 
                                                                                                                                                 
doctrine in Malaysian courts); Roznai, supra note 174, at 699 701 (discussing rejection of the doctrine in 
Malaysia, Singapore, and Sri Lanka). 
176 See Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 456 57 (1976); AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: 
CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION 288 94 (1998); cf. Albert, supra note 105
 
177 Although it could be said that Article 96 of the Japanese Constitution employs the same approach 
of subjecting all amendments to the same adoption and ratification 
process, the historical circumstances surrounding the Civil War and Reconstruction largely mirror the 
revolutionary circumstances that made such drastic changes permissible in Japan at the time of the adoption 
of the Meiji and 1946 Constitutions. See discussion supra Section II.B. 
178 Although that has not prevented hardliner segregationists from attacking aspects of the adoption 
process to discredit the Fou See, e.g., Forrest McDonald, Was the 
Fourteenth Amendment Constitutionally Adopted?, 1 GA. J.S. LEGAL HIST. 1 (1991). 
179 Far from being rife for abuse, many Japanese politician and even some scholars have decried 
the constitutional amendment process in Article 96 as a near impossible hurdle. See, e.g., Stephen Harner, 
Why Abe Is Right About Constitutional Revision, FORBES (Dec. 23, 2013, 9:30 PM), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/stephenharner/2013/12/23/why-abe-is-right-about-constitutional-revision/; 
Why Should the Current Japanese Constitution Be Amended?, JAPAN INST. FOR NAT L FUNDAMENTALS 
(Nov. 30, 2012), https://en.jinf.jp/news/archives/1623. 
180 Despite this superficial similarity, fundamental differences in the drafting history and context 
surrounding the adoption of the Indian Constitution and the Constitution of Japan would counsel against 
employing the same reasoning. In justifying its reliance on the Preamble, the Kesavananda Court noted that 
diverse peoples . . . [The Indian Constitution] has a noble and grand vision. The vision was put in words in 
the Preamble and carried out in part by conferring fundamental rights on the people. The vision was 
 v. State 
of Kerala, (1973) 4 SCC 225, 306 (India). 
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2. Unwritten Unamendability Doctrine in the United States 
as a Jumping-Off Point 
Because Japan is a civil law country, the learned views of 
constitutional scholars are often treated as a source of law unto themselves 
and can be highly influential.181 As such, scholarly opinions on implicit 
unamendability in both the United States and Japan can provide some insight 
into what facets of constitutional text and structure may be instructive when 
interpreting Article 96. In regards to the U.S. Constitution, the common 
understanding is that every provision is amendable. Douglas Linder 
summarized this notion as follows: Nothing could be more inconsistent 
with the conception of the living Constitution than an unamendable 
amendment or an amendment authorizing unamendable amendments and 
which by its own terms is unamendable. 182 While it may seem at odds with 
a constitution designed for the purpose of protecting individual liberties, this 
concept is deeply rooted in the history of the U.S. Constitution. 183 
Entrenchment provisions were thought to endanger the long-term viability of 
any constitution, increases the risk of violence and 
revolutionary change, and it increases the risk that people will grow to 
disrespect the source of the institutions and arrangements that are forced on 
them. 184 There are, nevertheless, some provisions in the U.S. Constitution 
that were explicitly entrenched against amendment. The only clause that 
specifically recognized such statuses was located within Article V itself.185 
As part of a compromise to secure ratification in the Southern states, Article 
V prohibited amending the Constitution to abolish the slave trade or impose 
any direct taxation on states prior to 1808.186 The equal representation of 
states in the Senate no state, without its 
consent, shall be deprived of its equal suffrage in the Senate 187 The Equal 
Suffrage Clause may therefore be constructively unamendable, as no state 
would rationally consent to a reduction of its own representation.188 Aside 
from these provisions in Article V, U.S. scholars have also indicated that 
                                                 
181 See THE JAPANESE LEGAL SYSTEM, supra note 24, at 59 60. 
182 Douglas Linder, What in the Constitution Cannot Be Amended?, 23 ARIZ. L. REV. 717, 731 (1981). 
183 See AMAR, supra note 32, at 285 86 (describing problems with the Articles of Confederation that 
convinced the founders of the need for flexibility). 
184 Linder, supra note 182, at 731. 
185 See U.S. CONST. art. V, § 2. These temporal entrenchments have long since expired, so nothing is 
explicitly unamendable at present. See Albert, supra note 173, at 22 & n.97.  
186 See U.S. CONST. art. V, § 2; Linder, supra note 182, at 721; AMAR, supra note 32, at 20 21. 
187 U.S. CONST. art. V, § 3. 
188 See Albert, supra note 2, at 662; Linder, supra note 182, at 717 n.3. 
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various fundamental concepts, such as certain democratic participation rights 
protected by the First Amendment,189 may be so 
identity as to have acquired unamendable status.190 Some have additionally 
argued that the Equal Protection Clause, perhaps due to its widespread 
popular support in the political realm as well as in private civil litigation and 
popular culture, may be considered unamendable.191 And yet scholars and 
politicians alike have seriously advocated for the repeal or curtailment of 
various provisions in both the First and Fourteenth amendments.192 
Although the implicit limits to the amendment power of Article V are 
far from settled, arguably any such limits must have at least some root in the 
actual text of the Constitution and not just popular support. One interesting 
claim of unamendability has focused on the specific language used as 
he No Religious Test Clause of Article VI 
no religious Test shall ever be required as a Qualification to any 
Office or public Trust under the United States 193 One scholar has argued 
his is the only instance of the  in the 
Constitution, and it is the only time any word indicating permanence appears 
in the Constitution e No Religious Test Clause is therefore implicitly 
entrenched against amendment.194 This claim, while certainly novel, is not 
entirely indefensible insofar as it finds support both within the text and in the 
                                                 
189 See Albert, supra note 105, at 40. 
190 See, e.g., LAURENCE H. TRIBE, THE INVISIBLE CONSTITUTION 33 34 (2008) (suggesting that a 
republican form of government and the rule of law may be unamendable concepts); AMAR, supra note 32, 
at 292 (suggesting that the amendment power itself cannot be eliminated). See generally Yaniv Roznai, 
Towards a Theory of Unamendability (N.Y.U. Pub. Law and Legal Theory Working Papers, Paper No. 515, 
2015), http://lsr.nellco.org/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1515&context=nyu_plltwp (surveying various 
theories of unamendability with a focus on primary and secondary constituent power). 
191 See JOHN R. VILE, A COMPANION TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION AND ITS AMENDMENTS 
110 (6th ed. 2015). 
192 This includes the current U.S. President. See Phillip Bump, Donald Trump and Scott Walker Want 
, WASH. POST (Aug. 18, 2015), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2015/08/18/donald-trump-and-scott-walker-want-to-
repeal-birthright-citizenship-its-nearly-impossible/; Josh Marshall, Priebus: Trump Considering Amending 
or Abolishing 1st Amendment, TALKING POINTS MEMO (Apr. 30, 2017, 3:41 PM) 
https://talkingpointsmemo.com/edblog/priebus-trump-considering-amending-or-abolishing-1st-amendment. 
Of course, calls for amending the First Amendment have come from both sides of the aisle. See, e.g., David 
Cole, How to Reverse Citizens United: What Campaign-Finance Reformers Can Learn from the NRA, 
ATLANTIC, Apr. 2016, https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2016/04/how-to-reverse-citizens-
united/471504/. 
193 U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 3 (emphasis added). 
194 George Mader, Binding Authority: Unamendability in the United States Constitution A Textual 
and Historical Analysis, 99 MARQ. L. REV. 841, 843 (2016). 
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.195 That same scholar also reasoned that, 
since the U.S. Constitution itself contains at least one explicit entrenchment 
provision and quite possibly two other implicit ones unamendable 
provisions are not entirely contrary to the spirit of a living constitution.196 
Even assuming that inclusio
implicitly entrench the No Religious Test Clause, the question remains of 
whether such an entrenchment itself would also be considered unamendable. 
Despite being invoked to amend the U.S. Constitution twenty-seven 
times, the Supreme Court has not yet specifically recognized any implicit 
limits to Article V.197 Various procedural challenges to ratified amendments 
have been deemed justiciable,198 although it is unclear what a justiciable 
substantive challenge would look like. 
even provisions not subject to normal amendment 
can still be changed, but only by utilizing additional processes or by 
adopting an entirely new constitution.199 Constitutional law scholar Akhil 
Reed Amar suggests that even the explicit entrenchment provisions in 
Article V could themselves have been amended out, thereby allowing a 
second amendment to ban slavery prior to 1808.200 
process that would be required to overcome 
implicit entrenchment provisions as well. Because Article V does not limit 
its own scope, it also does not proscribe the future enactment of provisions 
explicitly entrenched . 201  Therefore, if 
such a doubly entrenched amendment is enacted,202 future generations must 
still be able to remove those explicitly unamendable provisions under the 
proper circumstances. 203  When that time comes, it is undoubtedly the 
                                                 
195 See id. at 870 78. But cf. AMAR, supra note 32
. 
196 See George Mader, Generation Gaps and Ties That Bind: Constitutional Commitments and the 
, 60 HOW. L.J. 483, 515 17 (2017). 
197 See CONG. RESEARCH SERV., DOC. NO. 112 9, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF 
AMERICA: ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION 997 98 (interim ed. 2017), 
https://www.congress.gove/content/conan/pdf/GPO-CONAN-2017.pdf.  
198 See id. at 911 13; U.S. v. Sprague, 282 U.S. 716 (1931).  
199 See Albert, supra note 105, at 22 23 (discussing Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala, (1973) 4 
SCC 225, 366); cf. AMAR, supra note 32, at 295 99 (questioning whether Article V is the exclusive vehicle 
to amend the Constitution, as the text of Article V conspicuously lacks such a descriptor).  
200 AMAR, supra note 32, at 292 93.  
201 See Mader, supra note 196, at 495. 
202 Cf. Roznai, supra note 190, at 4 (discussing the proliferation of unamendable provisions in more 
than half of modern constitutions). 
203 Cf. Linder, supra note 182, at 733 (suggesting that Article V itself also cannot be amended to limit 
the scope of future amendments). An explicit entrenchment provision could thereby narrowly be read as 
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Supreme Court that must then determine whether those circumstances have 
been met,204 logically implying at least some degree of substantive review 
for constitutional amendments. Given the potential availability of judicial 
review at least to determine the amendability of explicitly entrenched 
provisions, there is no reason why the Supreme Court could not also 
theoretically invalidate an amendment that had failed to first repeal an 
explicit or implicit entrenchment. 
3. The Current Prevailing Views in Japan on Implicit Limits 
to Article 96 
Any discussion of the limits to constitutional amendments must begin 
with the first and only successful amendment in Japanese history the 1946 
Constitution itself. Given the extraordinary circumstances surrounding the 
adoption of the 1946 Constitution,205 however, there is no consensus among 
Japanese scholars on what implicit limits to Article 96 exist.206 This debate 
has resulted in two general camps of thought on the amendment power: 
207 Notably, the  
the position that U.S. constitutional scholars generally adhere to.208 So long 
as a proposed constitutional amendment satisfies the literal commands of 
Article 96
content then there are no limits to what can or cannot be amended.209 As 
such, the 1946 Constitution would have been a permissible amendment of 
the Meiji Constitution. The converse assertion is that, if two-thirds of both 
Houses and half of the Japanese voters so desired, sovereignty could just as 
easily be returned to the Emperor, thus reinstating the Meiji Constitution.210 
Going one step further, hardliner conservative theorists routinely decry the 
                                                                                                                                                 
only precluding amendment under the procedures in Article V, while still allowing for the adoption of some 
other amendment creating a new amendment process to circumvent those limits. 
204 See CONG. RESEARCH SERV., supra note 197, at 1011 14 (discussing Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 
433 (1939), and the availability of judicial review under Article V. 
205 For a more in-depth history of the drafting of the 1946 Constitution, see generally Goodman, 
supra note 2, at 23 25; KOSEKI S , supra note 36; MCNELLY, supra note 114. 
206 See Tsuji Yuichiro, Amendment of the Japanese Constitution A Comparative Law Approach, 37 
NANZAN REV. AM. STUDS. 51, 65 (2015). Coincidentally, the Japanese government largely consisting of 
career bureaucrats has not weighed in on which understanding of amendment limits (or lack thereof) it 
officially adopts. See id. at 63 (citing SAKATA MASAHIRO, S KU [GOVERNMENTAL 
INTERPRETATION OF THE CONSTITUTION] 308 (2013)).  
207 Id. at 64; see also ASHIBE NOBOYOSHI, supra note 153, at 385 386; 2 HIGUCHI Y ICHI ET AL., 
supra note 148, at 1440 50. 
208 See, e.g., Albert, supra note 2, at 667. 
209 See Tsuji Yuichiro, supra note 206, at 64; 2 HIGUCHI Y ICHI ET AL., supra note 148, at 1446 49. 
210 See Tsuji Yuichiro, supra note 206, at 64 65 (describing so-called constitutional suicide). 
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therefore lacks any real legitimacy.211 This view, while generally rejected by 
constitutional scholars, appears to have its greatest foothold in the nationalist 
movement.212 Unfortunately, many of those who lead the party that holds the 
reins on future constitutional reform also subscribe to such beliefs.213 
In contrast, u
provides the mechanisms for proposing and adopting amendments, Article 
96 cannot therefore be used to usher in fundamental changes that would 
destroy the Co
214 Although there is disagreement on the extent, 
the majority of Japanese scholars generally accept the proposition that the 
ability to amend the Constitution is limited.215 Many arguments focus on the 
theoretical aspects of popular sovereignty, assuming such limits naturally 
exist as the power to enact a constitution resides solely with the people, and 
the people would never allow for an amendment that would threaten their 
own sovereignty, such as reestablishing a monarchy.216 In contrast, under an 
Imperial monarchy, the Emperor could unilaterally 
in its entirety without threatening 
least.217 It is this distinction between Article 96 conferring only the power to 
the existence of such limits.218 Having established that Article 96 grants only 
ish a constitution, many 
                                                 
211 See Boyd, supra note 57, at 48 50; SHIGENORI MATSUI, supra note 24 at 262. For a published 
example of these arguments, see generally KOYAMA TSUNEMI, NIHONKOKU K  (2002). 
212 See Boyd, supra note 57, at 49 50. 
213 See CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL33436, JAPAN-U.S. RELATIONS: ISSUES FOR CONGRESS 8 (2016) 
some cases ultra-
Gelernter, Japan Reverts to Fascism, NAT L REV. (July 16, 2016, 8:00 AM), 
https://www.nationalreview.com/2016/07/japans-new-
 
214 Tsuji Yuichiro, supra note 206, at 65. 
215 See SHIGENORI MATSUI, supra note 24 at 260. For an early discussion on limits to Article 96, see 
Inomata K  et al.,  [Symposium: Should the Constitution be 
Amended or Not?], 68 C  K  (1953), reprinted in K [CONSTITUTIONAL 
AMENDMENT THEORY] 170 (Hasegawa Masayasu & Mori Hideki eds., 1977). 
216 See 2 HIGUCHI Y ICHI ET AL., supra note 148, at 1443 44; S TATSUO, supra note 24, at 571. 
In many respects, this understanding, mirrors and predates
doctrine. See Tokujin Matsudaira, Japan s Election and Constitutional Revision, INT L J. CONST. L. BLOG 
(Dec. 18, 2012), http://www.iconnectblog.com/2012/12/japans-election-and-constitutional-revision/. 
217 See 2 HIGUCHI Y ICHI ET AL., supra note 148, at 1440 41. 
218 See id. at 1443
monarchies were overthrown). 
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scholars have settled on at least three fundamental pillars that cannot be 
amended through the exercise of that limited power.219 Some contend that 
the popular referendum requirement in Article 96 is also unamendable, as 
abolishing it would greatly upset the balance of popular sovereignty.220 
One major dilemma is how to harmonize this limited theory with the 
reality that the 1946 Constitution itself arguably far exceeded the limits of 
In an attempt to alleviate this 
tension, the August Revolution theory (hachigatsu kakumei setsu) posits that 
. 221 Under this 
theory, it was in actuality the Potsdam Declaration which laid out the 
terms for 222 that reverted sovereignty in 
Japan to the people, whereby the processes in Article 73 were followed 
merely to give the appearance of legitimacy. 223  The Emperor officially 
accepted those terms of surrender on August 14, 1945,224 hence the name 
 concept of 
Imperial sovereignty enshrined in the Meiji Constitution therefore posed no 
bar to the passage of a wholesale revision.225 By diminishing the role of the 
Meiji Constitution in the adoption process, this theory attempts to preserve 
the assumption that amendments are implicitly limited to those that do not 
destroy or rewrite the Constitution itself. Despite the August Revolution 
226 common criticisms include the fact that 
the Potsdam Declaration of its own terms did not demand the transfer of 
                                                 
219 See id. at 1444 45. Those pillars consist of popular sovereignty, individual rights, and pacifism. 
See id.; ASHIBE NOBOYOSHI, supra note 153, at 386 87; SHIGENORI MATSUI, supra note 24, at 260 61; 
S TATSUO, supra note 24, at 571 73. 
220 See ASHIBE NOBOYOSHI, supra note 153, at 387 88; S TATSUO, supra note 24, at 573. 
221 See SHIGENORI MATSUI, supra note 24, at 18 21; MILLER, supra note 9, at 274 77. See generally 
MIYAZAWA TOSHIYOSHI KENP  NO GENRI [PRINCIPLES OF THE CONSTITUTION] 376 89 (1967) (explaining 
  
222 See Birth of the Constitution of Japan: Potsdam Declaration, NAT L DIET LIBR., 
http://ww.ndl.go.jp/consitution/e/etc/c06.html (last visited Sept. 4, 2018).  
223 See KOSEKI S , supra note 36, at 124 29; cf. 2 HIGUCHI Y ICHI ET AL., supra note 148, at 
1441 43 (doubting any real legal continuity between the Meiji and 1946 Constitutions due to such inherent 
limits to the amendment power). 
224 See Birth of the Constitution of Japan: Imperial Rescript of the Termination of the War, August 14, 
1945, NAT L DIET LIBR., http://www.ndl.go.jp/constitution/e/shiryo/01/017shoshi.html (last visited Sept. 4, 
2018). 
225 See SHIGENORI MATSUI, supra note 24, at 19; MILLER, supra note 9, at 354 n.67; MIYAZAWA 
TOSHIYOSHI, supra note 221, at 387 89.  
226 See Yamashita Takeshi, 8-gatsu kakumei setus to 4-gatsu seitei setsu
wa itsu ka [August Revolution Theory and April Establishment Theory When Is the 
Birthday?], T L. REV., Mar. 2008, at 1, 5. 
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sovereignty from the Emperor to the people,227 as well as the fact that the 
Meiji Constitution continued in force up until the new Constitution took 
effect on May 3, 1947.228 The government at the time rejected this theory by 
reiterating that legal continuity was maintained by complying with the Meiji 
.229 Regardless of the precise mechanisms 
involved,230 at the very least, it is safe to say that the 1946 Constitution has 
since been accepted by the vast majority of the Japanese people as legitimate. 
Even if Japanese scholars are generally in agreement that removing 
certain fundamental pillars goes beyond the scope of Article 96,231 the lack 
of explicit textual support in Article 96 may impede courts from reaching a 
similar conclusion. Another critique scholars must contend with is that there 
232 Despite such 
criticisms, Japanese scholars have constructed text-based arguments for the 
unamendability of the three fundamental : 
popular sovereignty, individual rights, and pacifism. 233  Although these 
concepts can be traced back to the Potsdam Declaration234 and instructions 
from General MacArthur235 and others within the Occupation,236 Japanese 
scholars understandably prefer to rely on the Preamble.237 
                                                 
227 See id. at 6 7; cf. MCNELLY, supra note 114, at 216 n.2 (noting that a prior draft would have 
explicitly allowed the preservation of the current constitutional monarchy). 
228 See KOSEKI S , supra note 36, at 4; SHIGENORI MATSUI, supra note 24, at 16, 19. For an 
overview of the various theories on when the Meiji Constitution ended, see Yamashita Takeshi, supra note 
226, at 3 10. 
229 See MILLER, supra note 9, at 354 nn.68 69; MCNELLY, supra note 114, at 28 29. 
230 Some scholars also attempt to resolve this issue by noting that the new Constitution did not 
become supreme law of Japan until Japanese sovereignty was officially returned on April 28, 1952. See 
Yamashita Takeshi, supra note 226, at 29; Takehana Mitsunori,  
[Procedure of Amendments to the Constitution of the Empire of Japan], 62 KOMAZAWA U. L. REV. 1, 29 
(2001). In turn, Koseki refers to May 1949 as the true birth of the Constitution, when the Diet declined the 
opportunity to pass further amendments and adopted the 1946 Constitution. KOSEKI S , supra note 36, 
at 4. 
231 See Tsuji Yuichiro, supra note 206, at 66; SHIGENORI MATSUI, supra note 24, at 18. 
232 See 2 HIGUCHI Y ICHI ET AL., supra note 148, at 1445 46. Matsui identifies several other 
autonomy, and Japanese society, although he stops short of claiming that such concepts are also 
unamendable. SHIGENORI MATSUI, supra note 24, at 29 35. 
233 See SHIGENORI MATSUI, supra note 24, at 260; ASHIBE NOBOYOSHI, supra note 153, at 385 88. 
234 See Birth of the Constitution of Japan: Potsdam Declaration, supra note 222. In particular, Article 
Id. 
235 Albert, supra note 2, at 674. The three basic points that General MacArthur identified as essential 
to include in the new constitution were: retaining the Emperor as head of state, abolishing the sovereign 
right to wage war, and ending the feudal system. See Birth of the Constitution of Japan: MacArthur Notes 
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We, the Japanese people, . . . determined that we shall secure 
for ourselves and our posterity . . . the blessings of liberty 
throughout this land, . . . do proclaim that sovereign power 
resides with the people and do firmly establish this 
Constitution. . . . We . . . desire peace for all time and . . . 
recognize that all peoples of the world have the right to live in 
peace, free from fear and want.238 
Although those three pillars can be found in the Preamble much like Indian 
nowhere does the text explicitly 
declare the corresponding provisions to be unamendable.239 Acknowledging 
affirm the preexisting implicit limits on the amendment power.240 
The unavoidable question that arises is what effect or legal force can 
be attributed to rights or concepts recognized only in the Preamble? As far as 
lthough that Preamble indicates the 
general purposes for which the people ordained and established the 
Constitution, it has never been regarded as the source of any substantive 
power 241 The Supreme Court of Japan reached a similar conclusion in 
                                                                                                                                                 
, NAT L DIET LIBR., http://www.ndl.go.jp/constitution/ 
e/shiryo/03/072shoshi.html (last visited Sept. 4, 2018). 
236 The State-War-  7, 1946 policy directive in 
 See MCNELLY, supra note 114, at 4 7; 
Birth of the Constitution of Japan: Reform of the Japanese Governmental System (SWNCC 228), NAT L 
DIET LIBR., http://www.ndl.go.jp/constitution/e/shiryo/03/059shoshi.html (last visited Sept. 4, 2018) 
[hereinafter SWNCC 228]. 
237 See SHIGENORI MATSUI, supra note 24, at 261; ASHIBE NOBOYOSHI, supra note 153, at 387. 
238 K pmbl. (emphasis added). 
239 
Constitution did not contain an actual Preamble, although the Imperial Rescript on promulgation served 
that role. MCNELLY, supra note 44
drafted by a single GHQ officer. Id. Although it was removed from the first Japanese draft, it was promptly 
Id. at 83 84. 
240 cle 
89 of the French Constitution. See ASHIBE NOBOYOSHI, supra note 153, at 387. However, this argument 
overlooks the fact that those foreign constitutional provisions are substantive and explicitly entrench certain 
concepts against amendment the Preamble of the Constitution of Japan shares neither quality. Compare 
GRUNDGESETZ [GG] [BASIC LAW] art. 79, sec. 3, translation at http://www.gesetze-im-
internet.deenglisch_gg/index.html (Ger.) 
federalism] . . . or [ and 1958 CONST. art. 89, para. 5 (Fr.) 
with K  pmbl. 
derived from the people . . . this is a 
. 
241 Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 22 (1905).  
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Ishizuka v. Japan
not a concrete right enforceable by courts. 242  The Nagoya High Court 
revisited that same clause in 2008, albeit reaching a slightly different 
conclusion.243 In dicta,244 the High Court declared that the Preamble, while 
legal normative character
provides guidance on how to interpret other provisions in the Constitution.245 
246 the High Court reasoned 
that an unenumerated right to live in peace was cognizable under Article 13, 
247 
when viewed in conjunction with the renunciation of war in Article 9.248 
Although not providing tangible rights, the Preamble may yet prove useful 
in guiding the interpretation of more concrete provisions in the Constitution. 
Even assuming that the Preamble has independent force, the Preamble 
of the 1946 Constitution contains very little support for the contention that 
these three mental cannot be altered in any way. In particular, 
claims for entrenchment of the pacifism principle in Article 9 have been 
drawn from the Preamble ,249 but this simply masks the reality that 
those arguments almost exclusively rely on popular support.250 Indeed, the 
relevant text is lofty even for the Preamble, arguably extending well beyond 
Japanese citizens.251 
question by subsequent attempts by the United States to urge Japanese 
                                                 
242 See : The Nagoya High Court Recognizes the Right 
to Live in Peace, 19 PAC. RIM L. & POL Y J. 549, 550 n.9 (2010) (discussing Ishizuka, supra note 137, at 
393). 
243 Id. at 550. 
244 The district court originally dismissed the case on standing, and the Nagoya High Court confirmed 
that dismissal, then proceeded to discuss the underlying right in dicta. While not bound to that ruling, the 
Okayama District Court followed the Nagoya High C See id. at 550 51. 
245 Id. at 560. In the Sunakawa case, Justice Tanaka, analyzing the merits of the security treaty, found 
 cooperation 
Sunakawa, supra note 120, at 3241 (Tanaka, J., concurring). 
246 Cf. 
ntees in the Bill of Rights). 
247 K art. 13. 
248 Hamilton, supra note 242, at 560 61; see also Yuichiro Tsuji, Constitutional Law Court in Japan, 
TSUKUBA H SEI [TSUKUBA J.L. & POL.], Mar. 2016, at 65, 71 72.  
249 See ASHIBE NOBOYOSHI, supra note 153, at 387. 
250 See Albert, supra note 2, at 674 77; cf. se Article 9 of Constitution 
Produce Mixed Results, MAINICHI (May 22, 2017), https://mainichi.jp/english/articles/20170522/p2a/ 
00m/0na/009000c (explaining discrepancies in polls that show popular support for clarifying the 
constitutional role of the Self-Defense Force, but not for amending Article 9). 
251 See K pmbl. (emphasis added) all peoples of the world have the right to 
. 
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remilitarization.252 Without more concrete structural or textual support from 
the operative text of the 1946 Constitution rather than the lofty prose of the 
Preamble scholarly opinions may not be enough to convince courts to fully 
. This is not to declare that no textual bases exist 
within the 1946 Constitution that can support such claims of implicit 
amendment limits. However, to achieve those results, a broader textual 
onstitutional structure and history is necessary. 
III. THE ROLE OF HISTORICAL CONTEXT TO UNDERSTANDING IMPLICIT 
LIMITS ON THE AMENDMENT PROCESS 
A. Explicit Limits to the Amendment Process Under the Meiji 
Constitution Provide Context for Implicit Limits Under the 
1946 Constitution 
As noted above, Article 96 simply provides a procedural pathway for 
any 
Japan. It is the sole Article contained within Chapter IX of the Constitution, 
253  From a cursory glance of the text, the 
conclusion that the Constitution places no explicit or implicit limits on the 
amendment power in Article 96 seems inescapable. While such a 
straightforward answer is undoubtedly tempting, the Constitution of Japan 
and its structure must be understood in its historical context. The Meiji 
Constitution served as the model for the 1946 Constitution, which was then 
adopted pursuant to the existing amendment process in Article 73 so as to 
maintain legal continuity. As both documents share much of their structure 
and mechanics, understanding the latter requires examining the former. 
The 1946 Constitution consists of eleven chapters, 254 beginning with 
symbol of the State,
                                                 
252 See Lee Hudson Teslik, Japan and Its Military, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL. (Apr. 13, 2006), 
https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/japan-and-its-
estored in 1952, largely in response to the outbreak of the Korean War. See 
MCNELLY, supra note 114, at 149 50. 
253 See K ch. IX. 
254 The Chapters of the 1946 Constitution are arranged as follows: Chapter I, The Emperor (Articles 
1 8); Chapter II, Renunciation of War (Article 9); Chapter III, Rights and Duties of the People (Articles 
10 40); Chapter IV, The Diet (Articles 41 64); Chapter V, The Cabinet (Articles 65 75); Chapter VI, 
Judiciary (Articles 76 82); Chapter VII, Finance (Articles 83 91); Chapter VIII, Local Self-Government 
(Articles 92 95); Chapter IX, Amendments (Article 96); Chapter X, Supreme Law (Articles 97 99); 
Chapter XI, Supplementary Provisions (Articles 100 103). See id. chs. I XI. 
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recognizing the principle that all sovereign power is derived from the 
people. 255  Although the Meiji Constitution contained only seven 
chapters256 the first of which identified the Emperor as the sole source of 
Japanese sovereignty257 every chapter thereafter and their ordering to a 
large extent remained intact through the constitutional transition after World 
War II.258 Although the Constitution was rebuilt to reflect needed reforms as 
identified by the GHQ,259 the underlying structure was preserved,260 and 
many provisions were retained in their entirety.261 Certain institutions, such 
as the bicameral legislature, were reinserted at the behest of Japanese 
constitutional drafters,262 and several amendments from Japanese legislators 
to the text of the final draft were incorporated prior to its promulgation.263 
This understanding also reflects the reality that the 1946 Constitution was 
not a foreign document wholly .264 
                                                 
255 Id. art. 1. 
256 The Chapters of the Meiji Constitution are arranged as follows: Chapter I, The Emperor (Articles 
1 17); Chapter II, Rights and Duties of Subjects (Articles 18 32); Chapter III, The Imperial Diet (Articles 
33 54); Chapter IV, The Ministers of State and the Privy Council (Articles 55 56); Chapter V, The 
Judicature (Articles 57 61); Chapter VI, Finance (Articles 62 72); Chapter VII, Supplementary Rules 
(Articles 73 76). See MEIJI K  chs. I VII. 
257 Id. art. 1. 
258 
Constitution and was expanded from a 
meager two Articles to eleven. Compare id. arts. 55 56, with K  arts. 65 75. This was due to the 
absorption of many of the executive powers previously exercised by the Emperor, such as managing 
foreign affairs and concluding treaties. Compare MEIJI K  art. 13, with K art. 73. 
259 See KOSEKI S , supra note 36, at 79; 
, NAT L 
DIET LIBR., http://www.ndl.go.jp/constitution/e/shiryo/03/002_15shoshi.html (last visited Nov. 25, 20180 
[hereinafter Kades Letter]. 
260 See MCNELLY, supra note 44, at 58 (noting that one of the first things the GHQ drafters agreed on 
was to preserve the structure and headings of the Meiji Constitution); KOSEKI S , supra note 36, at 
91
new constitution for Japan but mere
the Hague Convention on Land Warfare, or for other practical reasons). 
261 Compare MEIJI K  art. 33 
and a House of R with K  art. 42 (Japan) 
 
262 See Hideo Tanaka, supra note 42, at 664. 
263 Id.; see also KOSEKI S , supra note 36, at 179 88 (discussing the adoption of Diet 
amendments to Articles 23, 25, and 26, as well as the insertion of Article 10). 
264 See, e.g., David S. Law, Three Popular Misconceptions About the Japanese Constitution, 
COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL., https://www.cfr.org/blog/david-law-three-popular-misconceptions-about-
japanese-constitution (last updated May 9, 2017). Although due to increasing rhetoric from the LDP and 
Prime Minister Abe, some western audiences have begun to accept that claim. See, e.g., Peter Landers, 
, WALL STREET J. (Aug. 17, 2016, 9:45 PM), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/biden-gets-japans-attention-with-nuclear-remark-1471424823. 
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As their structure and chapters are almost identical, some explanation 
must be given to the significance of the differences therein. For example, 
Article 9 of the 1946 Constitution is contained within its own chapter titled 
265 Its location within the 1946 Constitution is not 
happenstance.266 Chapter I of the Meiji Constitution contained seventeen 
Articles, whereas Chapter I of the 1946 Constitution contains eight. This is 
because 
Articles in the Meiji Constitution that gave the Emperor power to issue 
, 267 as well as 
,268  and the sole ability to declare 
war.269 
the Meiji Constitution have been repudiated and revoked. 
That strategic placement of constitutional provisions specifically 
seeking to rectify abuses of power under the Imperial government is also 
270 
Article 18 of the Meiji Constitution and Article 10 of the 1946 Constitution 
are essentia The conditions necessary for being a Japanese 
national shall be determined by law 271 However, in contrast to the Meiji 
Constitution, the Article immediately following the citizenship clause in the 
fundamental human rights 
guaranteed to the people by this Constitution shall be conferred upon the 
people of this and future generations as eternal and inviolate rights 272 and 
the remainder of the chapter bears little similarity to the Articles describing 
                                                 
265 K ch. II. 
266 
her tool commonly used in canon of constitutional interpretation. See BLOOM, supra 
note 133, at 44 ontextual arguments in landmark cases, 
including Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821); McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 
316 (1819); and Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803)). 
267 MEIJI K  art. 9; see also id. art. 6 (providing an Imperial veto over laws passed by the Diet); id. 
art. 8 (allowing for emergency ordinances); id. 
SHIGENORI MATSUI, supra note 24, at 10 12 (detailing how these weak 
checks on executive power led to Japanese militarization and World War II). 
amendments would reinser See LDP Draft, supra note 15, ch. IX (creating a 
with the effect of law). 
268 MEIJI K  arts. 11 12. 
269 Id. art. 13. 
270 K ch. III; see also MEIJI K   
271 K art. 10; accord MEIJI K  
Although the Japanese text does contain further differences in word usage and grammatical style. It is also 
worth repeating that this Article was not included in the GHQ Draft. See GHQ Draft, supra note 43. 
272 K  art. 11. 
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rights in the Meiji Constitution. 273  Of course, this directly reflects the 
 desire to rectify the vast human rights curtailments and abuses 
under the Imperial government,274 and, in many respects, was a necessary 
component for any post-World War II constitution in Japan.275 
The chapters on the Diet, the executive branch, the judiciary, and 
finances follow the same ordering in both the Meiji Constitution and the 
1946 Constitution, albeit with more specificity in duties and more checks 
and balances in the 1946 Constitution. Many of the changes to these sections 
reflect goals that the GHQ deemed necessary to the democratization of Japan, 
such as combining an English-style parliamentary system with an American-
style executive branch,276 while others reflect proposals from the Japanese 
Diet and Japanese drafters, who preferred to retain a bicameral legislature 
277  One significant role of the 
bicameral legislature is the ability of the House of Councillors to essentially 
veto a bill passed by the House of Representatives, who can then override 
that veto through a two-thirds majority vote.278 
The remaining chapters of the 1946 Constitution consist of provisions 
governing local governments, the amendment process, the supremacy of the 
Supplementary Provisions 279 In contrast, the Meiji 
Supplementary Rules 280 The 
                                                 
273 Compare, e.g., MEIJI K  art. 28 (emphasis added) within limits not 
prejudicial to peace and order, and not antagonistic to their duties as subjects, enjoy freedom of religious 
with K art. 20, para. 1 
religious organization shall receive any privileges from the Sta  
274 See SHIGENORI MATSUI, supra note 24, at 10 12; cf. Mindy Kotler, The Comfort Women and 
on Truth, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 14, 2014), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/15/opinion/comfort-women-and-japans-war-on-truth.html (detailing 
Even the Diet committee responsible for the Matsumoto Draft recognized the need to adopt measures to 
prevent future rights violations. See KOSEKI S , supra note 36, at 56. 
275 See, e.g., SWNCC 228, supra note 236, app. B, para. 6; Kades Letter, supra note 259, cmt. 4. 
276 See -
Japan Relationship 64 65 (May 22, 2006) (unpublished graduate dissertation, University of Montana) (on 
file with the University of Montana, at https://scholarworks.umt.edu/cgi/ 
viewcontent.cgi?article=3123&context=etd); see also K art. 66 (creating a Prime Minister and a 
civilian cabinet, all of whom are responsible to the Diet). 
277 See Hideo Tanaka, supra note 42, at 664. 
278 K art. 59, para. 2. Although the gridlock caused by the two houses being controlled by 
different political parties (nejire kokkai) has since resulted in some politicians to call for abolishing the 
House of Councillors. See, e.g., ET  SEISHIR , ICHIINSEI KOKKAI GA NIHON O SAISEISURU! [A UNICAMERAL 
LEGISLATURE WILL REGROW JAPAN!] (2012). 
279 K chs. VIII XI. 
280 MEIJI K  ch. VII. 
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concept of local self-government was not contained in the Meiji Constitution, 
although it was permitted by laws at the national level,281 and it was inserted 
into the 1946 Constitution 
conduct of local affairs. 282  The final chapter in the Meiji Constitution 
dealing with miscellaneous provisions was then split up in order to 
emphasize certain aspects, including important changes from the Meiji 
Constitution. The relationship between Chapter VII of the Meiji Constitution 
and Chapters IX and X of the 1946 Constitution, and what those similarities 
mean is further explored in the sections that follow. 
B. The Context and Importance of the Final Chapter of the Meiji 
Constitution 
283 the first provision in this Chapter was the amendment process in 
Article 73. Like many other provisions in the 1946 Constitution, the text of 
Article 96 also closely mirrors that of its counterpart in the Meiji 
Constitution, except that Article 73 imposed a two-thirds quorum 
requirement whereas the 1946 Constitution shifts the power of amending the 
Constitution to the public by requiring that any amendment be additionally 
subject to popular referendum.284 In addition to the amendment process in 
Article 73, Chapter VII contained three other provisions: 
Article 74. No modification of the Imperial House Law shall be 
required to be submitted to the deliberation of the Imperial Diet. 
(2) No provision of the present Constitution can be modified by 
the Imperial House Law. 
Article 75. No modification can be introduced into the 
Constitution, or into the Imperial House Law, during the time 
of a Regency. 
                                                 
281 See KOSEKI S , supra note 223, at 89 91; ASHIBE NOBOYOSHI, supra note 153, at 356; 2 
HIGUCHI Y ICHI ET AL., supra note 148, at 1371 76. 
282 Kades Letter, supra note 259, cmt. 5. Although the concept of local government was also 
contained in one of the drafts proposed by Japanese scholars, see KOSEKI S , supra note 223, at 89, it 
was not publicly distributed at the time, HIGUCHI Y ICHI ET AL., supra note 148, at 1378, and the Chapter is 
more readily attributable to policies in SWNCC-228, MCNELLY, supra note 114, at 77. 
283 MEIJI K  ch. VII. 
284 Compare K art. 96, with MEIJI K  art. 73 (Japan). A similar sentiment can also be seen in 
See CIA Draft, supra note 46. 
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Article 76. Existing legal enactments . . . shall, so far as they do 
not conflict with the present Constitution, continue in 
force. . . .285 
Although the amendment process was largely self-contained within 
Article 73 much as it exists in Article 96 of the 1946 Constitution the 
two Articles immediately following it both appear to impose some explicit 
constraints on the amendment process.286 Article 76, on the other hand, deals 
exclusively with wha  matter
it provides for what will happen to existing laws and contracts once the 
Meiji Constitution comes into effect. This Article appears to correspond 
ded in Chapter XI 
at the end of the 1946 Constitution. It is also fairly obvious that Article 73 of 
the Meiji Constitution is almost directly transplanted into Chapter IX 
therefore, Chapter 
spiritual successor to Articles 74 and 75 of the Meiji Constitution Articles 
that imposed explicit limitations on the amendment process. 
This theory, while based primarily on the constitutional structure, is 
further supported by the content of those two Articles and their combined 
effect on the amendment process. By explicitly separating the processes for 
modifying the Meiji Constitution and the Imperial House Law, Article 74 
provided for something of a dual supremacy clause.287 The Diet, even when 
acting pursuant to the amendment process in Article 73, was prohibited from 
288 Likewise, the 
Emperor, acting through the Imperial House Law, could not unilaterally 
dismantle or undermine the Constitution. 289  Likewise, Article 75 further 
                                                 
285 MEIJI K  arts. 74 76 (emphasis added). Although translated as modification,  the Japanese 
term actually used in Paragraph 1 of Article 74 is kaisei, translated elsewhere as .  Id. art. 74, 
para. 1. Other instances of modify  use the term henk , or alter,  see id. art. 9, arguably because they 
refer to the process of changing the Imperial House Law, id. art. 74, para. 2, or both processes, id. art. 75.  
286 See Takehana Mitsunori, supra note 230, at 20 23. 
287 
constitutional structure. Id. at 20. 
288 Hirobumi , lead architect of the Meiji Constitution and first Prime Minister of Japan, reasoned 
that the Imperial House Law bears no relation to the reciprocal rights and duties  mentioned elsewhere in 
the Meiji Constitution, and therefore any modifications need not be subjected to the Diet. HIROBUMI I , 
COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE EMPIRE OF JAPAN 155 56 (
Press 2d ed. 1978) (1906). 
289 See id. at 156. (describing Paragraph 2  
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solidifying the Imperial veto over 
amendments.290 By prohibiting any amendment during a Regency, Article 75 
ensured that the Diet could not conspire to take advantage of 
ailment or age to undermine the Imperial structure.291 In addition to those 
limitations, Article 73 itself required all proposed amendments to originate 
from an Imperial Order,292 so the system was explicitly designed with the 
control.293 Articles 73, 74, and 75, while primarily procedural in nature, were 
designed to guarantee a substantive outcome protecting the Emperor as the 
supreme source of law and legitimacy in Japan. 
These provisions in conjunction erected a barrier around the Emperor 
 effectively entrenching the Imperial order itself against 
dismantlement, unless the Emperor should somehow decide to do so 
himself.294 Because both constitutions share nearly identical structures and 
many similar provisions, it can rationally be understood that Chapter X of 
the 1946 Constitution should function in the same manner as Articles 74 and 
75 of the Meiji Constitution by implicitly entrenching substantive aspects 
of the Constitution against dismemberment.295 Of course, because Article 73 
was never invoked to amend the Meiji Constitution until the adoption of the 
                                                 
290 The Emperor already had the explicit power to veto any bill passed by the Diet. See MEIJI K
HIROBUMI I , supra note 288, at 12 (remarking that 
). 
291 HIROBUMI I , supra note 288, at 157 (noting that this restriction was justified as the Imperial 
 and only the Emperor has the power of 
amendment). 
292 MEIJI K   
293 See HIROBUMI I , supra note 288, at 153 (confirming that the process in Article 73, which 
). 
294 Surely such a situation was unthought-of at the time, and yet that is exactly what transpired after 
the Japanese surrender ending World War II. Cf. Takehana Mitsunori, supra note 230, at 9 (noting the 
sovereignty was likewise unamendable). Once again, this serves to reiterate the point that all regimes
constitutional or otherwise ultimately must give way to revolution. Or, to assert the negative, barring a 
revolution, adhering to the provided amendment scheme is the sole means of altering a constitution. 
295 In a similar manner, one of the many textualist canons 
[the legislature] borrows a statute, it adopts by implication interpretations placed on that statute, absent 
WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 
324 (1994) (describing the borrowed statute rule). The 1946 Constitution by its own terms only rejects 
See K
proposed interpretation of Chapter X albeit relying on the structure of the Meiji Constitution would not 
reason to assume that such a structural comparison would be impermissible as an interpretive tool. 
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1946 Constitution itself, there are no judicial decisions on this precise topic 
either. As such, the only means of theorizing the potential limits of Article 
73 and its relation to the 1946 Constitution is through a textual and structural 
analysis, such as that employed above. 
C. Article 97  in Understanding the Function of Chapter X 
 
Given the understanding that the provisions directly following the 
ess in Article 73 were designed to 
place both procedural and substantive limits on that process, and in light of 
the previous discussion regarding the inherent structural and textual 
similarities between the Meiji and 1946 Constitutions, the provisions 
directly following Article 96 in the 1946 Constitution should likewise be 
expected to place similar constraints on the amendment process. Although 
Chapter X contains no express language acknowledging this functionality, 
Article 97 strongly hints that its purpose in fact is to provide just such an 
individual rights contained in Chapter III. 
The fundamental human rights by this Constitution guaranteed 
to the people of Japan are fruits of the age-old struggle of man 
to be free; they have survived the many exacting tests for 
durability and are conferred upon this and future generations in 
trust, to be held for all time inviolate.296 
Puzzlingly enough, no mention is made of the amendment process, nor of 
supreme law or express limits on governmental powers, seemingly 
foreclosing any possible relation to Articles 74 or 75 of the Meiji 
Constitution. In fact, the language of Article 97 closely mirrors that in 
Article 11 he people shall not be prevented from 
enjoying any of the fundamental human rights. These fundamental human 
rights guaranteed to the people by this Constitution shall be conferred upon 
the people of this and future generations as eternal and inviolate rights. 297 
The similarity in the Japanese text is even more striking.298 This then begs 
                                                 
296 K  art. 97. 
297 Id. art. 11 (emphasis added); see also id. 
people by this Constitution shall be maintained by the constant endeavor of the people . . .  
298 Id. arts. I] no kenri . . . . . 
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several questions: Is Article 97 merely a tautology? If so, why did the 
drafters decide to include two separate tautologies affirming the value of 
fundamental human rights one in Chapter III and one in Chapter X? If not, 
does Article 97 have any independent force separate from Article 11?299 
While the text itself claims neither to prohibit nor mandate any form 
of governmental action, the true purpose of Article 97 becomes clear only 
from the context of its placement in the constitutional scheme. Under the 
well-established rule against superfluity, language in a constitution must be 
interpreted in such a manner as not to render it mere surplusage.300 Chief 
Justice Marshall endorsed just such a canon of construction in the seminal 
case establishing the power of judicial review in the United States: Marbury 
v. Madison. The Chief Justice reasoned that [i]t cannot be presumed that 
any clause in the Constitution is intended to be without effect, and therefore 
such construction is inadmissible unless the words require it 301 While it 
certainly makes logical sense to assume that constitutional drafters would 
not include superfluous provisions in a foundational text, that principle of 
constitutional construction does not necessarily require courts to go out of 
their way to transform every clause of constitutional text into an operative 
one.302 Certain introductory clauses and preambles may 
not themselves be intended to have an operative effect. 303  Nevertheless, 
Chief Justice Marshall instructed that [i]f any other construction would 
                                                 
299 The question of drafting intent is particularly poignant here as the GHQ Draft did not contain this 
second provision on individual rights. See GHQ Draft, supra note 43, ch. X. The provision was inserted 
later by the Japanese drafters, supposedly in response to a request from the GHQ, although why it was 
inserted in Chapter X remains unclear. See SAT  TATSUO, supra note 66, at 116 17, 148 49. Despite early 
criticisms that Article 97 was a misplaced duplication of Article 11, its placement in Chapter X has since 
been suggested to indicate the unamendability of individual rights provisions. See HIGUCHI Y ICHI ET AL., 
supra note 148, at 1475, 1479.  
300 See BLOOM, supra note 133, at 21; cf. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 643 (2008) 
 
301 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 174 (1803). 
302 For example, the Tenth Amendment is one of the few provisions in the U.S. Constitution where 
See United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 
100, 124 (1941); see also Steven Schwinn, The ACA and the Tenth Amendment, SCOTUS BLOG (Aug. 5, 
2011, 1:38 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2011/08/the-aca-and-the-tenth-amendment/ (describing the 
commonly cited as providing a textual foundation for the anti-commandeering doctrine as well as for other 
federalism principles. See, e.g., New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 176 77 (1992); Printz v. United 
States, 521 U.S. 898, 936 (1997) (Thomas, J., concurring); Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 463 (1991). 
303 See Heller
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render the clause inoperative, that is an additional reason for rejecting such 
other construction . . . . 304 This distinction between prefatory and operative 
clauses, however, is inapplicable to Article 97, which itself would be 
rendered superfluous if read merely to restate similar language used in 
Article 11. G
following the amendment process and  it 
is highly unlikely that it was intended to act as an introduction of any sort. 
The language of the provision itself may also be significant in 
determining what effect it should be given. Article 97 is unique not only due 
to its placement in the constitutional scheme, but also for its command that 
fundamental human rig be held for all time inviolate 305 The Japanese 
term  only appears in two other provisions in the 1946 Constitution: 
Article 9 and Article 11.306 
in the No Religious Test Clause of the U.S. Constitution,307 the language 
utilized here also demonstrates an intent that fundamental human rights 
deserve some higher status than other constitutional provisions, which can 
be revised simply through the processes of Article 96. The significance of 
Article 97 may further be evinced by the fact that the LDP Draft eliminates 
it entirely.308 The LDP authors apparently recognized that a repeal of Article 
97 may be first be necessary to achieve the other proposed curtailments of 
fundamental rights in the LDP Draft, such as free speech.309 
Although Articles 74 and 75 of the Meiji Constitution explicitly 
mention the amendment process whereas Articles 97, 98, and 99 of the 
1946 Constitution do not when viewed in context, a strong inference can 
be drawn that the same entrenching effect remains. Applying the rule against 
superfluity especially in 
                                                 
304 Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 175. 
305 K art. 97. 
306 See id. art. 9, para. 2 [W]  id. [E]ternal and 
inviolat  
307 See U.S. CONST. art. V, § 3; Mader, supra note 194, at 843. 
308 In addition to the removal of Article 97, the LDP Draft heavily alters Articles 11 and 12. See LDP 
Draft, supra note 15, arts. 11, 12, 97; , 
REUTERS (May 23, 2013, 7:35 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-japan-abe-constitution/factbox-key-
facts-about-japans-constitution-proposed-changes-idUSBRE94N04920130524. 
309 See LDP Draft, supra note 15  provisions of the 
preceding paragraph [recognizing the freedom of expression], engaging in activities with the purpose of 
harming the public interest and public order and forming associations to attain this objective shall not be 
 The LDP appears to try not to draw attention to these changes in the propaganda it has 
published for its draft. See, e.g., LDP Announces a New Draft Constitution for Japan, supra note 10. 
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light of terms connoting permanence and must be given some different 
effect than Article 11. The placement of Article 97 in Chapter X also mirrors 
the placement of Articles 74 and 75 in relation to the amendment procedures 
in the Meiji Constitution. These should not be dismissed as coincidences. In 
Alden v. Maine, the U.S. Supreme Court described its process of interpreting 
the Eleventh Amendment to broadly recognize the doctrine of sovereign 
immunity: e have looked to history and experience, and the established 
order of things,  rather than adhering to the mere letter  of the Eleventh 
Amendment 310 Under this approach, the Court has consistently upheld 
falling outside the literal text 311  on the understanding that the 
Eleventh Amen  codify[] the traditional understanding 
312 Applying a similar reasoning to the Japanese 
Constitution, the textual and structural context of Article 97 illustrates a 
the limited amendment 
process that existed under the Meiji Constitution. By logical extension, 
therefore, Articles 98 and 99 also serve this purpose, as all are collectively 
contained within Chapter X as Part IV next explores how 
these provisions interact with Article 96 to give physical form to the implicit 
limits on the amendment process inherent in the Japanese Constitution. 
IV. IMPLICIT LIMITS ON AMENDING THE AMENDMENT PROCESS 
A. The Supremacy Clause in Article 98 and Its Potential Limits on 
Constitutional Amendments 
As previously noted, the GHQ drafters were aware of the availability 
of explicit entrenchment provisions.313 Examples could also be found in both 
the U.S. Constitution and the Meiji Constitution. 314  Contemporaneous 
constitutions also include entrenchment provisions for human rights and 
other fundamental democratic structures. For example, the German Basic 
Law of 1949 explicitly prohibits amendments that would destroy the 
rule of law or separation of powers.315 And yet no explicit limits on the 
                                                 
310 Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 727 (1999) (citations omitted) (quoting Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 
1, 13 14 (1890)). 
311 Id. at 727. 
312 Id. at 723. 
313 See discussion supra Section II.A. 
314 See discussion supra Sections II.D.2, III.A. 
315 GG art. 79, para. 3.  
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amendment power were included in Article 96. It is nevertheless unlikely 
that the GHQ or the Japanese citizens who suffered under military rule
would have supported a new constitution that could, as soon as the 
Occupation ended, unilaterally be repealed or replaced with the Meiji 
Constitution. Rather than the types of substantive amendment limits that 
have proliferated in recent history,316 a more likely notion is that the 1946 
Constitution inherited a similar form of semi-procedural entrenchment that 
existed in the Meiji Constitution. With Article 74 precluding amendment of 
the Imperial House Law, and Article 75 prohibiting any amendment while 
the Emperor was incapacitated, these procedural hurdles effectively 
reinforced the Emperor  veto power over amendments.317 While primarily 
procedural in nature, these requirements obviously encoded certain 
substantive value judgments318
the Meiji Constitution sought to entrench the principles of Imperial 
sovereignty and supremacy.319 The Supremacy Clause in Article 98 of the 
1946 Constitution, therefore, can be viewed as imposing a similar procedural 
barrier to amendments by effectively giving the Constitution itself
a presumptive 
veto. In other words, any act of government, including amendments to the 
1946 Constitution,320 can the provisions of Chapter X. 
The term contrary  is used only in Article 98, 321  although the 
underlying Japanese term hansuru is found elsewhere in both Article 18 and 
in the Preamble. perhaps attributable 
to a simple translation decision,322 the remaining instance of hansuru in the 
                                                 
316 See, e.g., Roznai, supra note 190, at 4. 
317 See MEIJI K  arts. 73 75.  
318 The line between what is procedural and what is substantive is notoriously blurry in many legal 
realms. Cf. 
ntive value judgment or put[] a stamp of 
 
319 
Constitution is constructively entrenched against amendment, as no state would voluntarily vote to reduce 
its own representation. See Albert, supra note 2, at 662. 
320 See discussion supra Section II.B. 
321 Some significance can also be drawn from the fact that the language in Article 98 mirrors that in 
Compare U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2. 
stitution . . . shall be the supreme Law of the Land . . . anything . . . to the 
Contrary with K  art. 98, para. 1 
 
322 Article 18 K art. 18. This 
language is almost directly transplanted from the U.S. Constitution. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1. The 
text of the second clause in Article 18 literally translated proh contrary to the 
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Preamble is particularly significant given its context. Setting the foundation 
for the 1946 Constitution to replace the Meiji Constitution as the law of the 
land, the Preamble reject and revoke 
all constitutions, laws, ordinances, and rescripts in conflict herewith. 323 The 
sovereign power resides with the people . . . . 324 Although the Preamble 
325  and in this 
instance it 
Constitution under Article 98. As the Preamble indicates, any act of 
government that appears to undermine the principle of popular sovereignty 
This seems to confirm Article 
98  imposition of in place of a 
which can be 
exercised pursuant to the power of judicial review enshrined in Article 81 as 
expanded by Article 98 itself. Under this interpretation, t
would include any amendment to the Constitution that stands opposed to or 
calls into question the validity of those constitutionally entrenched norms in 
Chapter X. In particular, if the ultimate effect of any proposed amendment 
would cast doubt on the very principle of popular sovereignty, Article 98 
would empower the judiciary to exercise this presumptive power. 
When and how this power comes into play can be clarified by reading the 
Supremacy Clause in conjunction with its counterpart in Article 99. 
B. 
 
Article 99, the final provision contained in Chapter X, may also be 
instrumental in understanding the implicit constitutional limits on amending 
the amendment process. The Emperor or the Regent as well as Ministers of 
State, members of the Diet, judges, and all other public officials have the 
obligation to respect and uphold this Constitution. 326 Significant here is the 
requirement to both respect and uphold  the provisions of the 
                                                                                                                                                 
K art. 18 (emphasis added) 
( S]ono i ni hansuru kueki ni fukusaserarenai. ). In this context, hansuru does not require direct conflict
broader understanding. Cf. Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 440 (1968) (broadly interpreting 
the Thir  
323 K pmbl. (emphasis added). 
324 Id. 
325 See Hamilton, supra note 242, at 560 n.24. 
326 K art. 99 (emphasis added). 
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Constitution. 327  The Japanese term y go
although connoting 328 is 
wholly unique to this provision. Nowhere else does the Constitution impose 
such a duty.329 For that matter, the Japanese term gimu
 does appear in several other locations, but only within Chapter 
III, 330 That is to say, the language of 
Article 99 more closely resembles that of an individual right than any of the 
sekinin) of public officials.331 
Some advocates opposed to constitutional revision have interpreted 
this provision as precluding government officials from proposing or even 
discussing wholesale constitutional revision.332 While somewhat extreme, 
this understanding reflects the reality that public officials are already 
subjected by law to oaths of office that prohibit defamatory remarks.333 Such 
restrictions on political activity have been routinely upheld against public 
workers and court officers,334 although Article 96 clearly contemplates some 
ability for politicians to discuss amending the Constitution.335 Nevertheless, 
the Supreme Court of Japan has said relatively little about Article 99 itself or 
whether it is independently enforceable.336 When the Court does mention 
Article 99 in passing, it may be cited as a basic presumption that officials, 
including elected members of the Diet, will obey judicial decisions even 
                                                 
327 Japanese scholars have interpreted these terms to essentially mean the same thing. See HIGUCHI 
Y ICHI ET AL., supra note 148, at 1505 (equating both terms with mamoru 
Constitution, but only public officials excluding the Emperor must additionally uphold it. See LDP 
Draft, supra note 15, art. 99. How courts would treat that difference in language is unclear. 
328 , KOTOBANKU, https://kotobank.jp/word/ -652922 (last visited Mar. Shingai, 
kigai kara, kabai mamoru koto.  
329 Although Article 26 does use a related term hogo 
protection K art. 26 (emphasis added). 
330 See id. arts. 26 27, 30. 
331 See, e.g., id. 
shall be collectively responsible  
332 See Urabe Noriho,  [The Duty to Respect and Uphold the Constitution], 
H  [JAPAN INST. CONST. L.] (Feb. 21, 2013), http://www.jicl.jp/urabe/ 
backnumber/20130221.html; SHIGENORI MATSUI, supra note 24, at 270 (interpreting Article 99 as 
 HIGUCHI Y ICHI ET AL., supra note 
148, at 1507 (noting that, under the limited theory of Article 96, advocating for an amendment exceeding 
implicit limitations would not be permissible). 
333 See -  to wa? [
in Article 99 of the Constitution?], NIPPON K  [JAPANESE COMMUNIST PARTY] (Mar. 19, 2003), 
http://www.jcp.or.jp/akahata/aik2/2003-03-19/2003-0319faq.html. 
334 See SHIGENORI MATSUI, supra note 24, at 201 n.63. 
335 K  
336 See generally HIGUCHI Y ICHI ET AL., supra note 148, at 1503 10. 
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those that invalidate legislation as unconstitutional.337 Most scholars have 
generally interpreted this provision as a truism, simply restating the fact that 
public officials owe the people as the source of sovereignty under the 1946 
Constitution a duty to avoid constitutional errors and violations in carrying 
out public affairs.338 Additionally, Article 99 can be read as imposing a 
moral or logical duty on public officials to proactively prevent and resist 
activities abhorrent to the Constitution.339 
Perhaps the best way to understand the purpose of Article 99 is to 
contrast it with the proposed All people shall respect 
this Constitution. Members of the Diet, Ministers of State, judges, and all 
other public officials have the obligation to respect and uphold this 
Constitution. 340 The LDP Draft would effectuate two significant changes to 
 the Constitution, previously only 
imposed on public officials, would be extended to all people. This could be 
considered particularly problematic in light of other proposed amendments, 
such as a completely new provision that would constitutionally create a duty 
341 Failure to sing the 
national anthem would no longer be an exercise of free speech but a 
constitutional violation.342 Second, the LDP Draft would completely exempt 
the Emperor from any requirement to uphold  the Constitution.343 Although 
the LDP Draft purports to maintain the principle of popular sovereignty, 
several provisions including this amendment to Article 99 have been 
cited as an indication that the LDP is actually seeking to reinstate the Meiji 
                                                 
337 See, e.g.  no.209, 67 M  1503,1538 
dissenting), http://www.courts.go.jp/app/files/hanrei_jp/745/083745_hanrei.pdf. Article 99 is also 
unconstitutional laws. See HIGUCHI Y ICHI ET AL., supra note 148, at 1507 08; Sunakawa, supra note 120, 
at 3281 (Okuno & Takahashi, JJ., concurring). 
338 Nitta Hiroshi,  [A Comparing 
Legal Study on Concrete Method to Defend Constitution], C  [STUD. REGIONAL 
POL Y], Feb. 2009, at 19, 22, http://www1.tcue.ac.jp/home1/c-gakkai/kikanshi/ronbun11-4/nitta.pdf; 
HIGUCHI Y ICHI ET AL., supra note 148, at 1505. 
339 Nitta Hiroshi, supra note 338, at 22. 
340 LDP Draft, supra note 15, art. 102 (emphasis added). 
341 Id. art. 3; see also Repeta & Jones, supra note 11, at 320
 
342 Many school districts already have rules that require teachers to stand and sing the national 
anthem, and those rules have been upheld as constitutional. See Kyla Ryan, Japan: Controversy Over the 
National Anthem, DIPLOMAT (June 22, 2015), https://thediplomat.com/2015/06/japan-controversy-over-the-
national-anthem/. 
343 See Repeta & Jones, supra note 11, at 320 (suggesting that this change is tied to elevating the 
status of nationalism and national symbols). Although perhaps the Emperor may still fall under the duty for 
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ructure.344 Needless to say, no analogous provision 
 existed in the Meiji Constitution.345 
Attempting to synthesize these varying conceptions of Article 99 is no 
meager task as is the case with any constitution, many provisions are 
intentionally vague to ensure ample flexibility to adapt to unforeseen 
circumstances. 346  While the straightforward meaning that follows is that 
government officials must obey the Constitution, the inverse proposition is 
equally conceivable. That is, any public official, under direction by their 
superior or by a co-equal officer or branch of government, can assert Article 
99 as an independent right to object to such an unconstitutional directive or, 
at least, to seek clarification on its constitutionality from the Supreme 
Court.347 Such an interpretation would be in alignment with the scholarly 
understanding of Article 99 to impose a duty to avoid causing or failing to 
rectify constitutional violations.348 This interpretation can also be applied in 
the form of a judicial inference that legislators and other government actors 
are presumed to follow the Constitution, and therefore any actions carry a 
. 
C. Is Article 96 Itself Implicitly Unamendable or Entrenched 
? 
Although this Comment argues that Chapter X of the 1946 
Constitution is best understood as implicitly limiting the scope of Article 96, 
no provision therein appears to prohibit amending the amendment process 
itself. Indeed, none of those Articles are themselves explicitly entrenched 
against amendment. Given the fact that the drafters chose not to make the 
entrenchment provisions explicit, this may reflect a compromise rooted in 
                                                 
344 See Goodman, supra note 2, at 39. 
345 The closest language appears only in the Imperial Rescript on promulgation, which is also 
See MEIJI K  pmbl. s of State, 
on Our behalf, shall be held responsible for the carrying out of the present Constitution, and Our present 
and future subjects shall forever assume the duty of allegiance to the present Constitution . . . .  
346 See, e.g., Robert W. Bennett, Are We All Living Constitutionalists Now?, in ROBERT W. BENNETT 
& LAWRENCE B. SOLUM, CONSTITUTIONAL ORIGINALISM: A DEBATE 165, 173 74 (suggesting that vague 
or ambiguous language in the U.S. Constitution was intentionally inserted as compromises, to allow future 
generations to decide, or to mollify other constituents); cf. Albert, supra note 173, at 80 82 (discussing 
constitutional resilience and the value in constitutions that can adapt to rapidly changing circumstances). 
347 See K art. 81. Of course, seeking clarification in such a manner by violating a directive would 
jurisdiction in such a case. 
348 See Nitta Hiroshi, supra note 338, at 22. 
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the desire to emphasize certain constitutional values.349 The first step is to 
synthesize the analyses from previous sections into a concrete understanding 
of what the implicit entrenchment provisions in Chapter X signify. 
Some constitutional scholars argue that entrenchment provisions are 
themselves implicitly unamendable. 350  Amar signals that the entrenched 
provisions can be amended simply by first amending out the entrenchment 
clause and then amending the previously unamendable provision.351 While 
others claim there is no need to go through such a formalistic double 
amendment  process a single amendment can accomplish both.352 Albert 
similarly 
and legal continuity, to act as a counterbalance against any constitutional 
dismemberment. 353  Under this rule, any amendment or the Constitution 
itself
354  There is also some theoretical support for 
amendments exceeding the scope of Article V, based on the history of the 
Constitutional Convention exceeding its scope of amending the Articles of 
Confederation to instead propose an entirely new constitution.355 A similar 
historical argument exists in Japan, as the 1946 Constitution far exceeded 
the scope of what an amendment could theoretically accomplish under the 
                                                 
349 Given the complex and secretive drafting history and ratification process, a court would likely try 
to avoid any over-reliance on previous drafts or contemporary statements. Instead, the text and structure of 
the Constitution itself are more likely to guide any determination on the limits of amendments. See 
discussion supra Section II.A. 
350 See Yaniv Roznai, Amending , CONST. MAKING & CONST. CHANGE 
(Oct. 20, 2014), http://constitutional-change.com/amending-unamendable-provisions/. 
351 AMAR, supra note 32, at 292 93; see also Roznai, supra note 350; Albert, supra note 2, at 663 
n.75 (positing 
 
352 See Roznai, supra note 350; Linder, supra note 182, at 729 (suggesting that the 1861 Corwin 
Amendment, which would have prohibited future amendments from abolishing the institution of slavery, 
would nonetheless have been implicitly repealed upon passage of the Thirteenth Amendment). 
353 Albert, supra note 173, at 7. 
354 Id. at 6. Applying this theory to Japan, Albert theorizes that, because the 1946 Constitution was 
enacted via Article 73 of the Meiji Constitution, the Constitution cannot validly impose an additional 
popular referendum requirement -thirds 
vote in both Houses. Id. at 76. Of course, because the Meiji Constitution itself was promulgated by Imperial 
Order, under this rule of mutuality, the Emperor could unilaterally rescind both the Meiji and 1946 
Constitutions at the same time. Albert does attempt to distance himself from such an extreme proposition 
sary 
predicate for public acceptance of any amendment, much less any new constitution. Id. at 77. 
355 See Richard Albert, , CATO UNBOUND (Dec. 11, 2015), 
https://www.cato-unbound.org/2015/12/11/richard-albert/americas-unamendable-constitution. 
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Meiji Constitution. If an entirely new constitution can be enacted under the 
disguise of an amendment,356 do entrenchment provisions even matter? 
Once again, Japanese courts are likely to adopt a middle-ground 
approach no provision is itself unamendable, but any barrier entrenching 
certain provisions against amendment must itself first be explicitly repealed. 
But how should courts textually justify such a position? When a new statute 
or amendment is enacted, under the doctrine of implied repeal, any older 
provisions in conflict with the newly enacted law become legally inoperable, 
even if not explicitly repealed.357 For example, the Twenty-First Amendment 
to the U.S. Constitution explicitly repealed the Eighteenth Amendment, 
effectively ending the practice of Prohibition.358 In contrast, the Thirteenth 
Amendment did not explicitly repeal anything, and yet is understood to have 
effectively nullified the Three-Fifths and Fugitive Slave Clauses.359  U.S. 
courts generally employ a very strong presumption against implied repeal in 
statutory interpretation cases, but only when conflict is avoidable.360 How 
                                                 
356 See SHIGENORI MATSUI, supra note 24, at 261 (comparing such an eventuality to the 1946 
Constitution and suggesting that, so long as such an amendment remained popular with the people, it would 
 
357 See generally Karen Petroski, Comment, Retheorizing the Presumption Against Implied Repeals, 
92 CAL. L. REV. 487 (2004) (providing an overview of the doctrine of implied repeal as well as recent 
examples). The doctrine is conceptualized as a corollary to the later-enacted-statute rule, which requires 
courts to give preference to the more recent statute if it conflicts with an older one.  
Id. at 498 n.53; see also Sunakawa, supra note 120, at 3272 (Kotani, J., concurring) (noting the common 
rule that subsequent laws are accorded priority and yet reasoning that treaties should have priority even if a 
subsequent law is in conflict). Although more commonly used in reference to statutes, the doctrine also 
applies to constitutional amendments. See Gabriel J. Chin, Reconstruction, Felon Disenfranchisement, and 
the Right to Vote: Did the Fifteenth Amendment Repeal Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment?, 92 GEO. 
L.J. 259, 275 (2004). 
358 See U.S. CONST. 
But cf. Laurence H. Tribe, How to Violate the Constitution Without 
Really Trying: Lessons from the Repeal of Prohibition to the Balanced Budget Amendment, 12 CONST. 
COMMENTARY 217, 219 20 (1995) (arguing that the inartful drafting of Section 2 of the Twenty-First 
Amendment effectively transforms individual violations of state alcohol laws into constitutional violations). 
359 See U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1; Chin, supra note 357, at 277; cf. Tribe, supra note 358, at 219 
n.12 (commenting that the Court exceeded what was necessary for an implied repeal by interpreting the 
Eleventh Amendment as extending beyond its literal text to reinvigorate state sovereign immunity). 
360 See, e.g.
showing of an intention to repeal, the only permissible justification for a repeal by implication is when the 
however, may involve intrinsic value judgments and vary highly depending on the reviewing judge. See 
Petroski, supra note 357, at 494 (noting the difficulties in determining whether two statutes are truly 
irreconcilable). Especially when it comes to the Reconstruction Amendments, scholars regularly debate 
whether or not an implied repeal has occurred and to what extent. See, e.g., Malinda L. Seymore, The 
Presidency and the Meaning of Citizenship, 2005 B.Y.U. L. REV. 927, 986 (2005) (arguing that the Section 
1 of the Fourteenth Amendment is irreconcilable with the Natural-Born Citizen Clause); cf. Michael Stokes 
Paulsen, A General Theory of Article V: The Constitutional Lessons of the Twenty-Seventh Amendment, 
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Japanese courts might resolve such a dilemma is less clear,361 but when these 
general legal principles are viewed in light of constitutional 
presumption of an intent to respect the Constitution,362 the combined effect 
should require a court to reject any interpretation of an amendment that 
would result in the presumptively unintended implied repeal of other 
constitutional provisions. If conflict is absolutely unavoidable and any 
application of the doctrine of implied repeal nevertheless produces results 
 under Article 98, then the Supreme Court may 
have no choice but to reject such an amendment. This presumption against 
the implied repeal of constitutional provisions would be strongest possibly 
insurmountable if the conflicting language forms part of the fundamental 
principles of the 1946 Constitution entrenched in Chapter X.363 
To paraphrase, Article 99 would require the reviewing court to 
assume that a challenged constitutional 
364 365 while not 
                                                                                                                                                 
103 YALE L.J. 677, 699 703 & nn.79, 88 (1993) (noting that the Corwin Amendment, which would have 
entrenched slavery, may not be completely irreconcilable with the Thirteenth Amendment, and therefore, is 
still potentially available for ratification via the same process as the Twenty-Seventh Amendment). 
361 Although Japan follows the general legal rule that a later-enacted statute is given priority when in 
direct conflict with an older statute, see discussion supra note 357, having never amended its Constitution, 
the author can only speculate that Japanese courts will look to U.S. experience for guidance. A similar 
controversy has arisen regarding how this legal principle might interact with a recent LDP proposal to add a 
-Defense Force in the Constitution. 
Compare Igarashi Jin, Abe 9-  [We Must Face the 
Dangers in Plan to Amend Article 9], BLOGOS (Sept. 15, 2017, 9:23 AM), http://blogos.com/article/ 
246324/ (suggesting that the proposal, as a later-enacted law, would effectively nullify Paragraphs 1 and 2 
of Article 9), with Momochi Akira, 
 [ - Being 
Acknowledged by the ], SANKEI N  (Jan. 23, 2018, 11:00 
AM), https://www.sankei.com/column/news/180123/clm1801230004-n1.html (arguing that the provisions 
would not be in direct conflict, and therefore the later-enacted rule would be inapplicable). 
362 
support U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 3 (emphasis added), and yet the doctrine of implied 
repeal has regularly been applied to amendments, see Chin, supra note 357, at 276 (listing examples). One 
argument to support potentially treating the Constitution of Japan differently rests in the historical context 
surrounding promulgation and adoption of the two constitutions. The U.S. Constitution came about from 
the failure of the Articles of Confederation to provide enough power and flexibility to the central 
government for it to properly function. See AMAR, supra note 32, at 25 29. In contrast, the 1946 
Constitution arose from the inability of the Meiji Constitution to constrain the central government and 
prevent the various abuses of power that resulted in World War II. See SHIGENORI MATSUI, note 24, at 12 
 counsels against permitting 
amendments that would impliedly repeal fundamental pillars of the Japanese Constitution. 
363 Cf. Petroski, supra note 357, at 527 28 (proposing a new approach to the presumption against 
implied repeal, with a weaker presumption if the older statute is obsolete or has generated no reliance 
interests, and a much stronger presumption for statutes codifying important rights). 
364 K art. 99. 
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impairing 366 any 
irreconcilable conflict would therefore be unintended and should be avoided 
at all costs.367 However, an affirmative intent to repeal any specific Article
even the entrenchment provisions in Chapter X if duly ratified by two-
thirds of both Houses and a majority of the public via referendum, must 
override any such presumption. For example, should the LDP seek to water 
down the individual rights in Chapter III implicitly entrenched by Article 97, 
the entrenchment provision itself must first be amended out. Likewise, in 
order to amend many of the provisions on the Emperor in Chapter I, Article 
99, and quite possibly Article 98, must first be amended to explicitly remove 
support for the fundamental pillar of popular sovereignty. Where the conflict 
is not as direct, the Court would still be justified in avoiding any implied 
consent. 
Now that the general contours of the implicit limits on Article 96 have 
been laid out, the next question is what this means for attempts to amend the 
amendment process itself. More specifically, what arguments grounded in 
the Constitution  would effectively preclude the LDP from first 
lowering the vote threshold in Article 96 and then removing the remaining 
Chapter X entrenchments under that lower threshold?368 The two-thirds vote 
barrier is itself significant, as a contextual analysis illustrates that the same 
supermajority requirement is employed elsewhere in the 1946 Constitution. 
For example, Article 56 provides the basic threshold for passing regular 
legislation in the Diet. The Article imposes a quorum requirement consisting 
one-third or more of total membership ll matters shall 
be decided, in each House, by a majority of those present, except as 
elsewhere provided in the Constitution 369 -thirds 
 
370  
                                                                                                                                                 
365 Id. art. 97. 
366 Id. art. 98. 
367 Such a strong presumption against implied repeal also appears to have also existed under the Meiji 
ified by the Imperial 
House Law, MEIJI K  er directly or 
indirectly bring about any alteration of the present Constitution, HIROBUMI I , supra note 288, at 156. 
368 
reduce the amendment threshold from a two-thirds vote to a simple majority in both Houses, as the 1946 
Constitution itself was passed under a two-thirds vote. However, that same rule would permit abolishing 
the referendum requirement which was not employed when the 1946 Constitution was adopted or more. 
See Albert, supra note 173, at 76. 
369 K art. 56 (emphasis added). 
370 Id. art. 55 
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371 372 Most 
importantly, a two-thirds vote in the House of Representatives can enact a 
bill into law over the objection of the House of Councillors.373 By raising the 
threshold against expelling duly elected members, the Constitution seeks to 
By 
doing the same for public debate in the Diet, the Constitution furthers 
interests in transparency to ensure that the public can hold their 
representatives accountable in the next election. And by allowing the House 
the House that most directly reflects public perception.374 The significance 
of these supermajority provisions becomes even more apparent when 
compared to the Meiji Constitution, which only imposed a supermajority 
requirement for the amendment process,375 and in fact proscribed any bill 
from being reconsidered if either of the two Houses had rejected it in that 
session.376 These supermajority provisions, therefore, protect an underlying 
value that was not recognized under the Meiji Constitution namely, 
popular sovereignty. That value forms the core of Articles 98 and 99. 
Furthermore, reducing the amendment barrier to a simple majority 
would directly cast in doubt the very supremacy of the Constitution. If the 
Constitution is 
easier to amend the Constitution than it would be to enact regular 
legislation otherwise, the Constitution is no longer supreme.  Any of 
those actions that would still require a supermajority vote would then exist 
on a higher plane than a mere amendment. Would a bill passed over the 
objections of the House of Councillors via Article 59 be superior to an 
amendment? Alternatively, could the subsequent passage of a national 
referendum by simple majority thereby transform any regular law into a 
constitutional amendment? These questions reach even more absurd results 
after factoring in the doctrine of implied repeal. With those Articles 
providing supermajority barriers in irreconcilable conflict with the LDP 
                                                 
371 Id. art. 57, para. 1. 
372 Id. art. 58, para. 2. 
373 Id. art. 59, para. 2. 
374 This is further evidenced by the fact that the House of Representatives serves shorter, four-year 
terms, and can be dissolved in order to immediately poll public opinion. Id. art. 45; see also SHIGENORI 
MATSUI, supra note 24, at 100 03 (noting that Prime Ministers have repeatedly invoked Article 7 to 
dissolve the House of Representatives, even though the Constitution contains no provision allowing for 
immediate dissolution). 
375 MEIJI K  art. 73, para. 2. 
376 Id. art. 39. 
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impliedly repeal Article 98 thereby destroying the entire constitutional 
structure or to impliedly repeal the other supermajority requirements. If a 
two-thirds vote is no longer required for amending the nominally 
for the House of 
Representatives to pass a regular law over the House of Councillors. 
Without an effective veto power, of what use would the House of 
Councillors be? Amending Article 96 would logically entail the abolishment 
of the bicameral system a system specifically reinserted by the Japanese 
drafters prior to ratification of the 1946 Constitution. Would a two-thirds 
vote still be necessary before ejecting duly elected members? Or could a 
simple majority rewrite the rules of conduct, then summarily expel all 
members of any opposition party? Because these supermajority requirements 
are so closely tied to the principle of popular sovereignty, lowering the 
amendment threshold would effectively mark the first step on returning 
Japan to authoritarian rule.377 These are far from abstract comparisons
Japanese bar associations378 and many others in Japan379 have recognized 
these incongruities and voiced their opposition to amending Article 96. 
                                                 
377 Cf. MCNELLY, supra note 114, at 74 (describing the view of some GHQ drafters that not including 
counter 
rights. See, e.g., A New , ECONOMIST (Apr. 20, 
2017), https://www.economist.com/asia/2017/04/20/a-new-bill-reveals-the-japanese-governments-
authoritarian- -terrorism bill); Bill Powell, How 
, NEWSWEEK (Sept. 29, 2015, 6:33 AM), 
https://www.newsweek.com/2015/10/09/shinzo-abe-critics-fear-militaristic-japan-future-377715.html 
(noting similarities between Prime M
Prime Minister). 
378 See, e.g., of Bar -
ni igi ari!! [We Object to Amending Article 96!!] (May 2013), https://www.nichibenren.or.jp/library/ja/ 
publication/booklet/data/constitution.pdf; Irome Yoshio, -
kanwa ni ha  [
Amending the Constitution in Article 96], NARA BENGOSHI KAI [NARA B. ASS N] (June 17, 2013), 
http://www.naben.or.jp/seimei_1615.html; Iwasaki Atsushi, -
 [
Amending the Constitution in Article 96], K BENGOSHI KAI [K  B. ASS N] (Aug. 27, 2013), 
https://kochiben.or.jp/ /; -
 [Resolution Against Relaxing the Requirements for Amending 
the Constitution in Article 96], SHIZUOKA BENGOSHI KAI [SHIZUOKA B. ASS N] (June 7, 2013), 
https://www.s-bengoshikai.com/bengoshikai/seimei-ketsugi/k13-6kenpou96/. 
379 See, e.g., -  [What is the Kyoto Article 96 Association?], K 96-
KAI [KYOTO ARTICLE 96 ASS N], http://kyoto.96jo.net/?page_id=13 (last visited Aug. 24, 2018); 
96- kaisei subeki desu ka? Bengoshi 48-  [
], BENGO4.COM (June 2, 2013, 
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directly runs afoul of the principles of constitutional supremacy and popular 
sovereignty entrenched in Chapter X. Because reducing the vote threshold 
for amendments under Article 96 would create an irreconcilable conflict 
with the fundamental norms in Articles 98 and 99, the Court would be 
justified in ruling that the proposed amendment exceeded the implicit limits 
placed on Article 96 itself through the provisions of Chapter X. Nevertheless, 
what the Court would do next with such an unconstitutional amendment is 
difficult to predict. There are, perhaps, several alternatives short of striking 
down the amendment in its entirety that the Court may prefer.380 One option 
would be to declare a state of unconstitutionality 381 without declaring the 
amendment itself void and to direct the Diet to rectify its error within a 
reasonable time.382 In the situation of an amendment to Article 96 itself, the 
Court could theoretically direct the replacement to comply with the original 
vote thresholds in Article 96 and enjoin the adoption of any other 
amendments in the meantime.383 Another option would be for the Court to 
find the ratification process procedurally inadequate.384 Because Article 96 
stipulates that 
385  any amendment must fully comply with those 
                                                                                                                                                 
3:05 PM), https://www.bengo4.com/other/1146/1287/n_377/; Press Rel
-
Article 96] (Mar. 21, 2013), http://www5.sdp.or.jp/policy/policy/constitution/images/130321.PDF; Reizei 
Akihiko, -  [Thoughts on the Problems with Amending Article 
96], NEWSWEEK JAPAN (Mar. 6, 2013, 1:42 PM), https://www.newsweekjapan.jp/reizei/2013/03/96.php. 
380 Recall that the Supreme Court of Japan is notoriously conservative and reluctant to even strike 
down regular legislation. See sources cited supra note 30. 
381 Sup. Ct. Nov. 20, 2013, Hei 25 (gy  tsu) 209, 67 MINSH  1503, 1526, 
http://www.courts.go.jp/app/files/hanrei_jp/745/083745_hanrei.pdf ( . . . ni hansuru j tai see 
also Toko Sekiguchi, Unconstitutional State but Not Unconstitutional, WALL STREET 
J. (Nov. 20, 2013, 9:43 PM), https://blogs.wsj.com/japanrealtime/2013/11/20/japans-elections-in-
unconstitutional-state-but-not- ight 
disparity between electoral districts in the 2012 elections). 
iken j tai
Tsuji, Vote Value Disparity and Judicial Review in Japan, REVISTA DE INVESTIGAÇÕES CONSTITUCIONAIS 
[J. CONST. RES.], May Aug. 2018, at 57.  
382 Notably, this is the approach the Court has repeatedly employed when dealing with disparity in the 
rtionment cases. See Shigenori Matsui, supra note 
30, at 1391 92; Haley, supra note 30, at 1477 83; Yuichiro Tsuji, supra note 381, at 78 85. 
383 
unconstitutional does not immediately strike down the law in question that duty generally lies with the 
Diet. See SHIGENORI MATSUI, supra note 24, at 145 (discussing the unconstitutional parricide law, which 
remained in place for over twenty years as the Diet failed to amend or abolish it). 
384 Recall that the Court expressed no qualms about reviewing the ratification process of the security 
treaty in the Sunakawa case. See supra note 157 and accompanying text. 
385 K art. 96, para. 1. 
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procedures as well. The Diet finally enacted a National Referendum Law in 
2007,386 which sets a time period for discussing any proposed amendment 
after passage in the Diet387 and establishes a National Referendum Public 
Relations Council388 to direct outreach and inform citizens of the proposed 
s effect. 389  If the voting public was not fully informed that 
ratification of the contested amendment would result in the implied repeal of 
other fundamental constitutional provisions, the Court could find the 
amendment procedurally invalid and require a new referendum for explicitly 
authorizing repeal of those provisions. Finally, the Court may be inclined to 
apply the strong presumption against implied repeal at its apex when 
potentially facing the implied repeal of a fundamental principle such as 
popular sovereignty to interpret an amendment in such a way as to avoid 
any direct conflict.390 What an amendment to Article 96 would have to look 
like in order to pass constitutional muster is not readily imaginable. 
However, one possibility is that the Court will interpret such an amendment 
not as repealing the existing amendment process but as creating a new one 
                                                 
386 
the Constitution of Japan], Law No. 51 of 2007. 
387 Id. art. 2, para. 1 (directing the public referendum to be conducted between 60 and 180 days after 
the Diet approves an amendment). 
388 Id. , Law No. 79 of 1947 arts. 102
11, para. 1 (establishing a Council composed of members from both Houses once an amendment is 
proposed). 
389 See, e.g., Law No. 51 of 2007, art. 14 (directing the Council to prepare and publish an easily 
understandable explanation of the proposed amendment, including arguments for and against, as well as a 
comparison with current law in a fair and unbiased manner). For an overview of the public announcement 
process, see  [National Referendum System: Public 
Announcement, Information, and Referendum Activities], S [MINISTRY INTERNAL AFF. & COMM.], 
http://www.soumu.go.jp/senkyo/kokumin_touhyou/syuchi.html (last visited Aug. 24, 2018). 
390 See Petroski, supra note 357
cf. Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 393 (1821) 
[T]he duty of the Court . . . [is] to construe the constitution as to give effect to both 
provisions, as far as it is possible to reconcile them, and not to permit their seeming repugnancy to destroy 
y be so strong as to justify almost rewriting the 
conflicting provisions to reach reconciliation. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism and 
Normative Canons, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 531, 556 n.141 (reviewing ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. 
GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS (2012)); Branch v. Smith, 538 U.S. 254, 
304  in part and concurring in part
But cf. Jesse W. Markham, Jr., The 
,  45 GONZ. L. REV. 437, 466 (2009) (arguing that the 
doctrine of implied repeal amounts to rewriting a statute); Petroski, supra note 357, at 512 n.118 (listing 
criticisms of implied repeal). 
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and then limiting its scope to technical corrections and other minor 
changes.391 
In summation, in order to amend Article 96, the LDP must first find a 
way to circumvent Articles 98 and 99 without subsequently destroying the 
entire constitutional structure in the process. That is not to say Article 96 is 
completely unamendable. If the Diet expressed an unmistakably clear intent 
to abolish Articles 98 and 99, and a majority of the public approved, those 
entrenchments must fall, leaving nothing to stand in the way of amending 
Article 96. Quite possibly, the only way this could be accomplished is by 
repealing and replacing the entire Constitution via endment. 
Given the inability of passing any amendment to the 1946 Constitution thus 
far, it is highly unlikely that this would be a viable method. The whole 
reason why the LDP has focused on amending Article 96 is because it would 
be much more difficult to attempt complete constitutional revision with the 
supermajority barrier intact. As it stands, under this structural understanding 
approach of first amending Article 96 to then easily dismantle the remainder 
of the Constitution is effectively foreclosed. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Every constitutional regime has a rich and complex history this is 
particularly true of the Constitution of Japan. Although simplifying the legal 
analysis may allow conclusions to be drawn across cultures, attempting to do 
so may ultimately . 
Not every constitution is the same nor should they be treated identically. As 
an expression 
cultural identity and societal norms. Any constitutional analysis, therefore, 
requires an equally critical lens.392 When dealing with theoretical questions 
                                                 
391 Thereby creating an explicit distinction betw
accomplishable through the original amendment process in Article 96. This would correspond to analogous 
distinctions contained in other constitutions. See supra note 77 and accompanying text. Such a solution 
would incidentally turn many of the ultraconservative arguments for amending the Constitution against 
themselves. See, e.g., - [Collected Documents 
of Constitutional Problems 12 Chapters for Understanding the Current Constitution], NIPPON KAIGI (July 
11, 2000), https://www.nipponkaigi.org/opinion/archives/882 (listing several minor translation errors in the 
Japanese Constitution as evidence for the need to lower the amendment threshold). 
392 Although this Comment reflects an attempt to step into the shoes of a Japanese court to analyze 
the implicit limitations on Article 96 under first principles, there is no guarantee that actual Japanese courts 
will reach the same conclusions. The author unabashedly relies on U.S. Supreme Court cases interpreting 
the U.S. Constitution to draw certain conclusions about the Japanese Constitution. This analysis may come 
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this high up on the legal hierarchy, however, the answers are necessarily 
complicated the relationship between constitutions and amendments has 
always been, and may forever remain, a blurry line. 
Employing a contextual analysis of both the Meiji and 1946 
Constitutions, this Comment concludes that Chapter X is the repository of 
those implicit limits. The three fundamental pillars therein consist of respect 
for fundamental human rights (Article 97), constitutional supremacy (Article 
98), and popular sovereignty (Article 99). For the many scholars who have 
relied on the Preamble to argue that the pacifism principle is also implicitly 
entrenched, this may come as an unsatisfactory result.393 However, as the 
be cognizable as an individual right under Articles 9 and 13, which would at 
entrenchment. Regardless, as the analysis in Part IV illustrates, any 
amendment to Article 9 must be conducted in the Diet under the current 
supermajority threshold and then submitted to public referendum the LDP 
 
Nevertheless, Article 9 may be constructively unamendable.394 Given 
the circumstances in Japan where only a minority of the public supports 
amending the Constitution,395 the public has given supermajority control in 
                                                                                                                                                 
out differently if the reviewing judges are more familiar with German constitutional law, or if they attempt 
to reach a conclusion based solely upon the dearth of Japanese Supreme Court cases. Japanese scholars 
have nonetheless argued for years that implicit limits on the amendment process must exist this Comment 
therefore seeks to logically tether those arguments to the text and structure of the Constitution. 
393 Professor Miyazawa 
MILLER, supra note 9, at 274, also rejected the notion that amending Article 9 would exceed the scope of 
Article 96, but suggested that popular sovereignty would, see Inomata K  et al., supra note 215, at 172. 
394 Constructive unamendability refers to a prolonged political climate where amendments are a 
practical impossibility due to the inability of proponents to meet the requisite vote thresholds. See Richard 
Albert, Constructive Unamendability in Canada and the United States, 67 SUP. CT. L. REV. 181, 182 
(2014). Although Albert discusses constructive unamendability in regard to the Equal Suffrage Clause in 
the U.S. Constitution, in Albert, supra note 2, at 662, he stops short of applying it to the situation in Japan. 
395 See , 
JAPAN TIMES (Jan. 14, 2018), https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2018/01/14/national/politics-diplomacy/ 
opposition-revising-constitution-grows-55-kyodo-survey/. Popular support for amending Article 96 also 
falls far short of the necessary threshold. See Aramaki Hiroshi & Masaki Miki,  
 [Pros and Cons Running Neck and Neck on Constitutional 
], H [NHK 
MONTHLY REP. ON BROADCAST RES.], July 2015, at 38, 46 http://www.nhk.or.jp/bunken/summary/ 
research/report/2015_07/20150702.pdf (reporting that only 18% of respondents supported revising Article 
enough, Emperor See Norihiro Kato, The Emperor 
and the Prime Minister, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 15, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/ 
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both Houses to a party renowned for its revisionist goals 396 any 
amendment in the near future is highly unlikely. So long as the 1.5-party 
system persists and Japanese voters have no viable alternatives, 397  the 
political process alone is not necessarily guaranteed to protect the interests 
of the people. Thankfully, Article 96 also requires the public to directly 
weigh in on any proposed revisions. More often than not, constructive 
unamendability is less the result of particular rights attaining some level of 
popular support398 than it is political impasse due to partisan bickering.399 
Due to the 1.5-party system, however, the type of constructive 
unamendability at issue in Japan is of a different kind altogether. 
II, if 
the 1946 Constitution reverting Japanese sovereignty from the Emperor to 
the people was a viable amendment under Article 73 of the Meiji 
of the 1946 Constitution must be 
an available recourse under Article 96. It could be argued that this historical 
exception is limited only to similar revolutionary circumstances under which 
the 1946 Constitution was adopted.400 Furthermore, because the adoption 
process complied not only with Article 73 but also with Articles 74 and 75, 
one could claim that 
entrenchment provisions in Chapter X. However, one must concede that 
there is no barrier in legality or legitimacy to prevent a complete 
                                                                                                                                                 
08/15/opinion/the-emperor-and-the-prime-minister.html; Ernils Larsson, Gap Widens Between the LDP 
, E. ASIA F. (Apr. 8, 2015), http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2015/04/08/gap-
widens-between-the-ldp-and-japans-liberal-emperor/. 
396 See Tomohiro Osaki, nal 
Revision, JAPAN TIMES (Dec. 19, 2017), https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2017/12/19/national/politics-
diplomacy/shinzo-abe-calls-japans-rebirth-2020-along-constitutional-
of revising the Constitution within a few years). According to a survey after the 2017 election, 80% of 
elected representatives even those not in the LDP- supported amending the 
constitution, and 52% were in favor of clarifying the Self-  VOTE 
2017: Constitutional Revision Backed by Over 80% of Lower House, ASAHI SHIMBUN (Oct. 23, 2017, 4:05 
PM), http://www.asahi.com/ajw/articles/AJ201710230048.html. 
397 See Gerald Curtis, , E. ASIA F. (Apr. 30, 2017), 
http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2017/04/30/japans-democratic-party-doomed-to-opposition/; Ken Victor 
Leonard Hijino, , NIPPON.COM (Oct. 12, 2017), 
https://www.nippon.com/en/currents/d00361/ (discussing the proliferation of small parties splintering off 
prior to elections, only to disappear or remerge with the LDP). 
398 Aside from popular support, other factors have also led to the constructive unamendability of 
Article 9, such as a desire to focus on economic recovery. See Martin, supra note 9, at 329 30. However, 
those factors that existed during the Cold War have all but abated. 
399 Of course, a near-identical climate rendering constitutional amendments a practical impossibility 
can also be said to exist in the United States. See Albert, supra note 355. 
400 Cf. Albert, supra note 173, at 5 7 (discussing the rule of mutuality). 
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constitutional revision, assuming the literal commands of Article 96 as it 
currently stands are followed. Indeed, who would have standing to challenge 
 At most, this historical precedent suggests 
that the source of sovereignty the Emperor under the Meiji Constitution, 
and the people under the 1946 Constitution must be fully aware of and 
explicitly consent to all changes resulting from any amendment. Textual and 
structural arguments have their limits, and this Comment attempts only to 
pave the pathway for a text-based understanding of the implicit limits on 
Article 96. The concept of popular sovereignty means that the public must 
ultimately decide, 
ambitions and popular opinion on the need for constitutional revision, 
hopefully this debate will remain in the realm of hypothetical speculation. 
